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GLIMMERS OF HOPE:  
THE EVOLUTION OF EQUALITY RIGHTS 
DOCTRINE IN JAPANESE COURTS FROM A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
CRAIG MARTIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Equality is a concept that has been a preoccupation in much of the 
thinking about justice since at least the age of Aristotle. It informs our most 
primordial and intuitive understandings of fairness. It is a concept that has 
been the subject of serious debate among philosophers, political theorists, 
and jurists since the seventeenth century. It has become embedded in 
modern notions of democracy. It forms the foundation of one of the most 
fundamental rights—the right to be treated as an equal and not to be 
discriminated against—that is enshrined in some manner in most modern 
democratic constitutions, and in the bedrock conventions in international 
human rights law. Yet there has been disagreement over the theoretical and 
philosophical foundations and origins of the right. This has been reflected 
in practical terms by the extent to which different jurisdictions have 
historically approached the protection and enforcement of the right from 
often markedly divergent perspectives. As a result, the content of the right, 
its scope, and the degree to which it has been meaningfully protected by the 
courts, has often varied appreciably across legal systems. Even in North 
America, in which Canada and the United States share a common legal 
heritage, the constitutional approaches to “equality rights” or “equal 
protection” (even the terminology varies), continue to be significantly 
different. 
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It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese approach to 
the constitutional protection of equality rights should be considerably 
different from each of these two North American models. Yet the 
Constitution of Japan of 1947 was primarily drafted by Americans,1 and 
constitutional rights theory in Japan has continued to be influenced by 
American jurisprudence. On the other hand, the constitutional provision 
that these young Americans crafted was actually quite unlike the American 
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, it was quite progressive and ambitious for 
its time, and as time marched on, the equality rights provisions of other 
national constitutions would come to share more with this provision of the 
Constitution of Japan, than any would share with the earlier American 
model. The equality rights provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, for instance, has much in common with that of the Japanese 
Constitution. So while it might seem intuitively unsurprising that the 
Japanese approach is different, there are reasons to think that it should be 
less so. Indeed, it has been argued that there is an increasing commonality 
to how the judiciaries of constitutional democracies analyze and enforce 
the right to equality, and Japan may be seen as an anomaly in that context. 
Notwithstanding the ambitiousness and apparent robustness of the 
equality rights provision in the Constitution of Japan, and the explicit and 
considerable authority conferred upon the judiciary to exercise judicial 
review powers to interpret and enforce such rights, the right to equality in 
Japan has had a sad history. As is well known and often explored, the 
Constitution of Japan as a whole has not enjoyed much protection or 
enforcement by the courts. In over sixty years, the Supreme Court of Japan 
has ruled that an impugned law or government policy was unconstitutional 
in less than ten cases, notwithstanding the fact that the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, rapporteurs under various U.N. human rights conventions, and 
international human rights organizations, as well as domestic legal scholars 
and non-governmental organizations (“NGO”), have all documented 
serious violations of rights in Japan. There has been a wealth of analysis, 
including much in English, on the various factors that might explain this 
feature of the Japanese legal system, ranging from cultural to institutional 
and systemic reasons.2 Many of these studies have made important 
 
 1. For two comprehensive histories of the drafting and ratification of the Japanese Constitution in 
English, see RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE 
NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR (2002) [hereinafter MOORE, PARTNERS] and KOSEKI 
SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore ed. and trans., 1997). 
 2. As a starting point for some of this literature, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 
Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 259 
(1997) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Judicial Independence]; J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) 
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contributions to the general understanding of the Japanese system, have 
provided significant foundations for practical normative responses to some 
of the perceived failings of the system, and have generated generalizable 
insights within the context of comparative law. Not many of these studies, 
and none of those in English, however, have analyzed the equality rights 
doctrine of the courts, or considered the extent to which the analytical 
approach of the courts may be a factor in perpetuating the failure to enforce 
this particular constitutional right. Most of the literature on equality rights 
in Japanese literature, to the extent that it engages in any comparative 
analysis, focuses predominantly on American jurisprudence.3 There is thus 
arguably a need for both a wider comparative analysis of the Japanese 
experience, and a closer examination of how the doctrine has developed 
and operated in relation to the protection of equality rights. 
This article examines how the Japanese courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, has analyzed equality rights issues. It explores the 
development of the doctrine of the Supreme Court by studying a number of 
the most important equality rights cases from a comparative perspective. In 
particular, the examination of the doctrine and its application is informed 
by the theoretical framework, a “proportionality analysis,” that underlies an 
increasing number of constitutional and international law approaches, of 
which the Canadian constitutional model provides a good example. The 
analysis of the Japanese cases through the prism of this increasingly 
universal “proportionality test”, exemplified in the Canadian jurisprudence, 
helps to bring into stark relief the shortcomings of the doctrine that has 
 
[hereinafter, RAMSEYER, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE]; John O. Haley, The Japanese 
Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, 
99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) [hereinafter, Haley, Judiciary]; Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or 
Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005) 
[hereinafter Upham, Political Lackeys]; David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial 
Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009) [hereinafter, Law, Conservative Court]. See generally 
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987) [hereinafter UPHAM, SOCIAL 
CHANGE]; JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998) [hereinafter HALEY, SPIRIT]; 
FUJII TOSHIO, SHIHŌKEN TO KENPŌ SOSHŌ [JUDICIAL POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 
(2007); ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ SOSHŌ NO RIRON [THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 
(1973). (Japanese names for Japanese language sources are provided in the standard Japanese format of 
surname first followed by given name). 
 3. It should be emphasized that this is so with respect to issues relating to individual rights 
enshrined in the constitution. For many other constitutional issues, there is considerable focus on the 
German and, to a lesser extent, French experience, given the shared civil law systems. Some of the 
seminal constitutional texts, which reflect this focus on American approaches to rights, include ASHIBE 
NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL]; 
MATSUI SHIGENORI, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ [JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], (2d ed. 2002); URABE 
NORIHO, KENPŌGAKU KYŌSHITSU (1988) [Course on Constitutional Law]; MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI, 
KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II] (1971); and KŌJI SATŌ, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (3d ed. 
1995). 
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been traditionally employed by the Supreme Court of Japan in its treatment 
of discrimination claims under the equality rights provision of the 
Constitution. It provides a solid foundation upon which to begin building a 
normative argument for why and in what manner the doctrine ought to be 
modified, if the Japanese judiciary is to give meaningful effect to the 
constitutional right.  
The Japanese Supreme Court has failed, until very recently, to develop 
an analytical framework that would be capable of resolving equality rights 
claims in a principled and rigorous manner that was true to the theory of 
rights and the values that were enshrined in the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court of Japan has almost exclusively, until 2008, employed a rudimentary 
“rationality test” similar to that initially developed in the early equal 
protection cases in the United States, and it has applied it universally in 
respect of all forms of discrimination. The test focuses on the question of 
whether, in the circumstances of the case, the discrimination in question 
was “unreasonable,” which is to be determined by reference only to criteria 
internal to the policy or law in question—that is, the relationship between 
the objective and the means of the legislation. 
A closer examination of this test (which we may call the 
“unreasonable discrimination test”), by way of comparison with the 
proportionality analysis employed in Canadian and other courts, and 
informed by the underlying theory of equality rights, suggests that it is not 
only tautological, and the basis for result-oriented decision making, but that 
it also creates confusion over what constitutes the essence of discrimination 
and the substantive content of the right to equality. The test thus provides 
the lower courts with no assistance whatsoever in terms of how to analyze 
issues of discrimination. Its application almost invariably leads to a finding 
that the discrimination in question is “reasonable.” As will be argued 
below, the judicial employment of this analytical framework and the failure 
of the Supreme Court of Japan to develop a doctrine that provides for a 
more sophisticated analysis, one which would require judges to work 
through a more rigorous reasoning process faithful to the theory of equality 
rights, have been significant factors contributing to the general failure of 
the courts to enforce this most fundamental of rights. And it will be 
suggested here, that notwithstanding the conservative nature of the 
judiciary and other factors that have militated against more robust rights 
protection in Japan, the development of a more sophisticated doctrine 
would likely make it more difficult for those factors to operate. In other 
words, it will be argued that doctrine does matter.  
Moreover, this review of the jurisprudence will suggest that there is 
evidence that a new analytical approach, consistent with the proportionality 
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test used in an increasing number of courts in constitutional democracies, 
may already be emerging as the dominant doctrine in the Japanese courts. 
Notwithstanding the grim history of not enforcing the equality rights 
enshrined in the Constitution, a recent decision of the Supreme Court offers 
a glimmer of hope, a suggestion that an approach that reflects a more fully 
developed appreciation of the scope of the right, and a more rigorous 
analytical model for use in resolving claims of discrimination, may be in 
the ascendency. Evidence of this emerging doctrine can be found in a 
number of strong dissents in some earlier cases and the manner in which 
some of the lower courts analyzed discrimination cases. With the 
Nationality Act case of 2008,4 there is reason for some optimism that this 
new approach is being embraced by the Supreme Court. The decision is 
examined in considerable detail below, showing how the majority opinion 
built upon the analysis of those earlier dissents, and illustrating how similar 
the reasoning is to that of the increasingly widespread proportionality 
model of constitutional analysis, as exemplified in the Canadian 
jurisprudence. 
From a normative perspective, it will be argued below that the 
majority opinion in the Nationality Act judgment ought to be embraced as 
the appropriate approach to equality rights issues in Japan. Japan currently 
faces numerous social pressures, resulting from the aging of its society, 
prolonged economic malaise, and the gathering pace of globalization. 
Many of its responses to these developments will increase the pressure on 
equality rights. This is particularly so with respect to the likely increase in 
the number of foreigners, who together will constitute a discrete minority 
within Japan, and among whom will be large numbers of people who will 
also constitute racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Japanese society has 
a well documented history of discrimination and a reluctance to provide 
full equality rights to minorities, and so it may be anticipated that the right 
to equality is going to come under increasing pressure in the years ahead.5 
 
 4. Supreme Court Judgment, (June 4, 2008), 62 MINSHŪ 6 1367 ( Nationality Act case), court 
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-Tsu-
.No..135-111255.html. 
 5. There is a wealth of literature on discrimination in Japan, particularly as it relates to the 
burakumin, who are descendants of a caste once labelled untouchable, the large Korean-national 
minority in Japan, ethnic and racial minorities, foreigners, the handicapped, and women. For official 
sources discussing such discrimination, a starting point would be the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2002 (Japan), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/5 (Apr. 25, 
2007) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/415/73/PDF/G0741573 
.pdf?OpenElement; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary Racial Discrimination: Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, (Mission to Japan), 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2 (July 11, 2005) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
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How the judiciary deals with increasing claims for protection from 
discrimination is going to be an important issue, not least for the continued 
credibility of the judiciary and the integrity of the constitutional order. 
It will also be argued that the comparative analysis provided here 
provides a powerful rationale for why, as one concrete element in the effort 
to encourage the continued development of a more robust doctrine, 
Japanese scholars should be looking to the jurisprudence of countries other 
than the United States for comparative study. For while Japanese scholars 
are generally critical of the Supreme Court’s approach to discrimination, 
the scholarship almost overwhelmingly looks to American constitutional 
jurisprudence on the issues of individual rights. The comparative 
examination in this article, which includes a review of both the Canadian 
and American approaches to equality rights, and analyzes the Japanese 
cases through the prism of both, illustrates why the approach exemplified 
by the Canadian model would be more appropriate, and a more fruitful 
basis for comparative study, than the American equal protection doctrine. 
The American doctrine is also out of step with the increasingly universal 
model of proportionality and the robust protection of a substantive right to 
be treated as an equal.  
This comparative analysis also suggests some interesting insights 
within the context of comparative constitutional law more generally, which 
could form topics for more focused study in the future. For instance, to the 
extent that the Japanese legal test is understood as having been borrowed in 
part from one aspect of the American equal protection doctrine, the 
Japanese experience may reflect some of the risks inherent in constitutional 
borrowing with insufficient attention to the context in which the borrowed 
principles originally operated.6 Similarly, to the extent that the Nationality 
Act case indeed reflects the emergence of a new doctrine, its similarity in 
many important respects with the essential aspects of the Canadian and 
other similar proportionality models, may suggest an important example of 
constitutional migration.7 On the other hand, the analysis of the operation 
of the older doctrine will be of interest to American scholars, for in a real 
 
UNDOC/GEN/G06/103/96/PDF/G0610396.pdf?OpenElement. For recent scholarship see, e.g., Mark 
A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan’s 
Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Levin, Racial Justice]. 
 6. On such risks, and the importance of a contextual approach, see, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, 
WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 1 (2008). 
 7. For a discussion of constitutional migration, and how it may be distinguished somewhat from 
constitutional borrowing, see generally Sujit Choudhry, Migration As a New Metaphor in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
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sense it provides a window into what might have been, an alternate reality, 
had the United States Supreme Court not developed the strict scrutiny level 
of review in the early years of the twentieth century. Moreover, the critical 
analysis of Japan’s universal application of a doctrine that is essentially the 
American minimum scrutiny test, viewed through the prism of the 
Canadian substantive rights approach, may generate some interesting 
questions regarding the basis for the narrow limitations on the application 
of strict scrutiny review in American jurisprudence. While the debate rages 
on in the United States over the appropriateness of ever considering foreign 
law, particularly in the context of constitutional cases, this comparative 
analysis of equality rights doctrine suggests that there is something to be 
learned from examining how substantially similar issues are analyzed by 
different courts. The analysis of the Japanese experience, and the possible 
development of a more robust and rigorous standard in Japan, may 
naturally lead to thinking about whether the U.S. doctrine could not 
similarly make some tentative steps towards stronger protection against 
discrimination. 
In Part I the article will very briefly review the sources of the right to 
equality in Japanese law. In Part II, the underlying theory of equality rights 
that informs this study is explained, and the Canadian and American 
approaches to the judicial protection of the right are reviewed. In Part III 
the early development of the “unreasonable discrimination” test in Japanese 
doctrine is examined, while Part IV provides an analysis of more recent 
application of the test. Part V explores the significance of the doctrine in 
the context of the general failure to enforce the right, and traces the origins 
of a new doctrine in early dissents. In Part VI, the article examines in detail 
the question of whether a new and more robust doctrine may be emerging 
in the Court’s treatment of discrimination claims, and the article ends with 
some discussion of the comparative constitutional law questions raised by 
the analysis. 
I. EQUALITY RIGHTS IN JAPAN – SOURCES OF THE RIGHT8 
Equality rights in Japan have as their primary source Article 14 of the 
Constitution, specifically Article 14(1). It provides that: 
 
 8. This section, as well as some of the analysis below of the earlier Japanese equality rights 
cases, are revised portions of a shorter paper on equality rights in the context of Japan’s aging society, 
published in 2008. See Craig Martin, Coming of Age: The Courts and Equality Rights in Japan’s 
Ageing Society, in THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE: A HANDBOOK ABOUT JAPAN (Florian Coulmas, 
Harald Conrad, Annette Schad-Seifert & Gabriele Vogt eds., 2008). 
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All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of 
race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.9 
The phrase “all of the people” is the accepted translation of subete 
kokumin in the context of Article 14, and it has been interpreted to include 
foreigners.10 A great deal has been written on how the terms “social status” 
and “family origin” are to be interpreted, and what concrete factors may 
fall within their scope, and also on the issue of whether the list of 
categories is exhaustive or illustrative.11 However, for our purposes we may 
simply note that the Supreme Court has ruled on at least two occasions that 
the list is illustrative and not exhaustive.12 It has also held that, while age is 
not the type of unchanging characteristic normally associated with social 
status for the purposes of the right, age is considered to fall within its 
scope.13 Similarly, foreign nationality has been treated as being a prohibited 
ground of discrimination falling within the scope of “social status,” even in 
the cases that have upheld the discrimination as having been reasonable.14 
Finally, Article 98 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land, and that any law, ordinance or other act of 
government contrary to the provisions of the Constitution is invalid, while 
Article 81 provides that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort with 
the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, regulation, or 
 
 9. Nihonkoku Kenpō [Constitution of Japan] art. 14 (1947). 
 10. Supreme Court Judgment, (November 18, 1964), 18 Keishū 9 579. Subete kokumin would 
normally be translated as “all nationals,” and indeed there was considerable conflict between the 
American drafters and representatives of the Japanese government over the use of this language in the 
revision and translation process during the drafting of the Constitution. See MOORE, PARTNERS, supra 
note 1, at 130-31. 
 11. A convenient overview of the leading academic interpretations of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in Japanese scholarship can be found in Hideki Shibutani, Enshu Kenpō 2 [Constitution 
2], 234 HŌGAKU KYŌSHITSU 113 (2000). For a more detailed analysis, see ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
supra note 3, at 123-25; ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ HANREI WO YOMU [Reading Constitutional Cases] 
133-36 (1987) [hereinafter ASHIBE, READING]; and with respect to the specific status of foreigners, 
NONAKA TOSHIHIKO AND URABE NORIHO, KENPŌ NO KAISHAKU [Interpretation of the Constitution], 
vol. 1, 209-13 (1989). 
 12. Supreme Court Judgment, (April 14, 1973), 27 KEISHŪ 3 265 (Patricide case) translated 
under the title Aizawa v. Japan, in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE 
LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 143-70 (1996); Supreme Court Judgment, (May 27, 1964), 18 
MINSHŪ 4 676 (Tateyama Mayor case). 
 13. Tateyama Mayor case, at para. 3. 
 14. Supreme Court Judgment, (November 18, 1964), 18 KEISHŪ 9 579. Shigenori Matsui suggests 
that, at least from a process theory perspective, the support for this position flows more from the 
international legal obligations that inform the constitutional analysis, in accordance with article 98(2) of 
the Constitution, than from a proper interpretation of Article 14 itself. See MATSUI, supra note 3, at 313. 
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official act of government.15 Thus, the courts have the authority, and 
arguably the duty, to enforce constitutional rights. 
While the right to equality in Article 14 strictly applies only to the 
relationship between the state and the individual, the Supreme Court has 
confirmed the practice of lower courts in employing the constitutional 
values of the equality right in Article 14 to inform and give substance to 
statutory provisions governing private relations. Thus, the broad and rather 
ambiguous provisions of the Civil Code that prohibit juristic acts that have 
as their object matters that are contrary to public policy or good morals, 
and that require the Code to be construed from the standpoint of the dignity 
of the individual and the essential equality of the sexes, have been 
interpreted in a manner that imported the equality values of Article 14.16 
In addition to Article 14, it has been argued that Article 13 of the 
Constitution also provides some assistance to understanding the importance 
of the individual, and identifying the centrality of individual dignity to the 
enjoyment of the other rights in the Constitution.17 Article 13 provides that: 
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in 
legislation and in other governmental affairs.18 
This provision has typically been interpreted within Japanese 
scholarship, and by the courts, as being a limiting provision, one that is 
relied upon by the courts for justifying the abridgment of rights. But the 
view that it also asserts the primacy of the individual and individual dignity 
is based in part on more recent interpretations of the provision by the 
courts. In an important case dealing with the aboriginal rights of the Ainu 
people in Hokkaido, the Sapporo District Court interpreted the provision as 
imposing a duty on the government: 
[T]his provision [Art. 13] demands the highest regard for the 
individual in his or her relationship with the state. It manifests the 
principles we call individualism and democracy as the recognition of 
 
 15. Nihonkoku Kenpō [Constitution of Japan] art. 81, 98. 
 16. See , Supreme Court Judgment, (March 24, 1981), 35 MINSHŪ 2 300 (Nissan Motors case) 
(holding that “a lower compulsory retirement age for women than for men constitutes discrimination 
against women based solely on their gender and is irrational discrimination invalid under Article 90 of 
the Civil Code . . . Article 1-2). For an English translation of this case, under the title Nissan Motors, 
Inc. v. Nakamoto, see BEER & ITOH, supra note 12, at 179-81. 
 17. Levin, Racial Justice, supra note 5, at 461-63, 471-88. 
 18. Nihonkoku Kenpō [Constitution of Japan] art.13. 
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the particular worth of all citizens, who collectively constitute the 
state, in the state’s exercise of governance.19 
Apart from the constitutional provisions, there are no other 
overarching statutory protections against discrimination in private relations. 
There are provisions in statutes governing specific spheres of activity that 
provide some protection, but these tend to be narrow, limited, and of 
debatable effectiveness. For instance, in the area of employment, the 
Labour Standards Law provides that “an employer shall not engage in 
discriminatory treatment with respect to wages, working hours or other 
working conditions by reason of nationality, creed or social status of any 
worker.”20 While the clause “other working conditions” is open to 
interpretation, hiring, recruitment, and termination are not included, nor are 
they interpreted as being covered. Gender is conspicuously absent, which is 
one reason that the early cases involving sex discrimination in the 
employment context were advanced on the basis of the Civil Code.21 
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
discussed this absence of general equality rights legislation in its report on 
Japan in 2001, and observed that the failure to enact legislation prohibiting 
racial discrimination was inconsistent with Japan’s obligations under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.22 The Ministry of Justice reported that it had drafted and 
submitted to the Diet a Human Rights Protection Bill in 2002, but the bill 
was not passed, and the Ministry of Justice “continues to review” the 
legislation.23 It appears at this stage, however, that it is unlikely to be 
enacted any time soon. Indeed, the Law on the Promotion of Measures for 
Human Rights Protection,24 enacted in 1996 as a step towards the 
establishment of a human rights regime, was repealed in 2002. No mention 
of the legislation has been made in the periodic reports of Japan to the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee.25 
 
 19. Sapporo District Court Judgment, (March 27, 1997), 938 HANREI TAIMUZU 75, translated 
under the title Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Comm. in 38 I.L.M. 394, 418 (1999). I am grateful to 
Mark Levin for highlighting the relationship between Articles 13 and 14. 
 20. Labour Standards Act, Law No. 49 of 1947 (Japan), art. 3. There are similar provisions in the 
Employment Security Law, Law. No. 141 of 1947. 
 21. UPHAM, SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 2, at 130. 
 22. See UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 
REPORT 34-38 (2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f52f3ad2.html. 
 23. Japanese Ministry of Justice, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues07.html. 
 24. Law No. 120 of 1996 (repealed 2002). 
 25. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1996: 
JAPAN CCPR/C/115/Add.3, (October 1, 1997) [hereinafter FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT], available at 
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Some local governments have initiated the passage of human rights 
regulation or more narrow anti-discrimination ordinances, but local 
governments have limited powers in Japan. Moreover, these efforts have 
actually been the object of attack by conservatives, such that the first such 
prefectural ordinance had to be repealed.26 Finally, under Article 98(2) of 
the Constitution, the treaties to which Japan is a state party are incorporated 
into the law of Japan, and thus the equality provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),27 International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (“ICESR”),28 the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism (“CERD”),29 and the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”),30 to name the most important, theoretically provide 
protections in the public domain.31 The courts of Japan, however, are 
reluctant to enforce provisions of such international treaties in individual 
litigation.32 This brief review of the more general failure to provide 
protection against discrimination in Japanese society underlines the 
importance of the Article 14 guarantee and how it is enforced by the 
courts—not only in respect of the relationship between the individual and 
the state, but indeed in the private realm as well. For in addition to the fact 
that there are few other protections available and that the courts have 
extended the values of Article 14 to inform the interpretation of other 
 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.115.Add.3.En?Opendocument. Japan also posted 
its 5th Periodic Report, dated December 2006, which was due to be filed in 2002, at http:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/civil_rep6.pdf. 
 26. Debito Arudou, How to Kill a Bill: Tottori’s Human Rights Ordinance is a Case in Alarmism, 
JAPAN TIMES, May 2, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20060502zg.html. 
 27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. Japan has been a state party since June 21, 1979. 
 28. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. Japan has been a state party since June 21, 1979. 
 29. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Japan has been a state party since Dec. 15, 1995. 
 30. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 22, 1980, 
19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). Japan has been a state party since 1985. 
 31. This proposition is not universally accepted, but is the dominant view of constitutional 
academics in Japan, has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, and is the position taken by the 
government in its reports to the Human Rights Committee. See YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 28-32 (1998); FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT, supra note 25, at paras. 
9-11. 
 32. See, e.g., Japanese Federation of Bar Associations, “Report of JFBA Regarding Second 
Periodic Report by the Government of Japan under article 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” Mar. 2, 2001 [hereinafter “JFBA Report”]. The government 
also noted in the 4th Periodic Report to the HRC, that in none of the decisions that considered the 
ICCPR was any law of Japan held to be inconsistent with the convention. FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT, 
supra note 25, at para. 10. 
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statutes, the doctrine developed for analyzing claims under Article 14 has 
similarly been imported into the judicial treatment of such private law 
cases. 
II. EQUALITY RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION – COMPARATIVE 
APPROACHES 
Before launching into a critical examination of the Japanese judicial 
model for the analysis of discrimination, however, it is necessary to be 
clear about what we mean when we speak of equality rights and 
discrimination, and to say a few words about the theoretical perspective, 
and the comparative approaches, that inform the analysis in this article. 
This section therefore begins with a brief overview of that theoretical 
approach, one that is widely accepted in the world, both in terms of its 
representation in a wide number of constitutional models and in 
international human rights instruments. There follows a short examination 
of the Canadian constitutional model, as an example of how this 
perspective has been operationalized in practical terms within a 
constitutional system. I use Canada not because it is necessarily the ideal 
model, but because it is a good example of an approach that is 
characteristic of a number of liberal democratic systems, and it is simply 
the one I know best. Moreover, there are similarities between the structure 
of the equality rights provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and that of its counterpart in the Constitution of Japan. Finally, 
this section provides a short review of the American equal protection 
doctrine, which is quite different in a number of important respects. It is 
revealing to compare the Japanese experience with both the substantive-
rights and full proportionality approach as reflected in the Canadian model, 
with the much more procedural and limited American doctrine, since 
aspects of the American approach have exercised a considerable degree of 
influence on the development of Japanese jurisprudence. 
A. The Theoretical Perspective – Substantive Rights 
The right to be treated as an equal by the government and not to be 
discriminated against, as that right is enshrined in a number of modern 
constitutions and international human rights instruments, means at the very 
minimum that the individual has a right to be treated by the state with equal 
respect and concern as compared to anyone else. At its foundation lies the 
Kantian concept of human dignity, in the objective sense of the inherent 
worth of every human being, and the notion that to treat someone as being 
intrinsically worth less than another is to do harm to their human dignity. 
Discrimination, defined broadly, is treating some people differently than 
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others, in the denial of benefits or imposition of burdens, in a manner that 
is unfair.33 
This leads to the question of what makes any particular differentiated 
treatment unfair, so as to constitute discrimination that violates the right to 
be treated equally. The fact that the distinction treats persons in a manner 
that suggests that they are less worthy of the state’s respect and concern, 
and thus does harm to their dignity, would be one indicia that the treatment 
is unfair. Where the distinction is based on prejudice or a stereotype, in 
terms of treating a person on the basis of generalizations that may be 
inaccurate and that defines the individual according to another group’s 
perceptions of him and “people like him,” that person’s autonomy is 
undermined and there is a presumption of harm. Similarly, where the 
treatment reflects and perpetuates excessive power imbalances, which 
again undermines the autonomy of a politically weaker group by limiting 
its members’ access to social and political institutions and the policy 
making process, or other such social goods, this may constitute indicia of 
unfairness. A further indicia is where the treatment is likely to undermine 
the subjective sense of dignity of the individual, or at least would do so to a 
reasonable person in the individual’s position. When we speak of the 
subjective sense of dignity rather than the objective inherent worth of a 
human being discussed above, it is the individual’s own sense of self-worth 
and self-esteem that is implicated.34 
Such constitutions as those of Japan, Canada, and South Africa, as 
well as the European Convention on Human Rights,35 and the major 
 
 33. There is obviously a vast abundance of literature on the issue of equality rights and 
discrimination, not only in law but also in political philosophy, ethics, and a range of other disciplines. 
It is a complex theoretical field and the overview of a perspective provided here is the very barest 
thumbnail sketch. An excellent analysis of the recent literature for the purpose of examining equality 
rights in the Canadian context, which I have drawn on here, is Sophia R. Moreau, The Wrongs of 
Unequal Treatment, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 291 (2004). The perspective represented here is also informed 
by RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter, DWORKIN, RIGHTS]; and 
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN]. Of course, the political philosophy of John Rawls, and his conception of 
justice, places a fundamental importance on the concept of equality. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); for a shorter review, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION (2002). 
 34. Moreau, supra note 33, at 294-97. 
 35. On its face Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights appears to be limited to 
discrimination in respect of the enjoyment of other rights in the Convention, however, it has been 
interpreted more broadly to prohibit discrimination more generally. Moreover, Protocol 12 to the 
Convention, which entered into force in April 2005, introduced a provision that any discrimination by a 
public authority on the basis of the listed prohibited grounds was prohibited, and as well any 
discrimination on such grounds in respect of any legal right was similarly prohibited. Protocol 12, with 
explanatory notes, is available at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/Prot12/Protocol%2012%20 
MARTIN_FINAL_JCI.DOC 3/1/2010  11:14:07 AM 
180 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:167 
international human rights conventions, actually build into the equality 
rights provision the presumption that differentiated treatment on the basis 
of certain grounds will be prima facie unfair. The prohibited grounds of 
discrimination (or suspect classifications, to use the American terminology) 
in those constitutions and conventions include such characteristics as sex, 
race, creed, national origin, religion, age, and social status. This reflects the 
underlying theoretical understanding that the treatment of individuals 
differently on the basis of personal characteristics that are immutable, or at 
least deep-rooted and extremely difficult to alter (such as religion and 
nationality), and which are related to the individual’s sense of identity and 
self-worth, will often be based on prejudice or stereotype, and likely will 
cause harm to the individual’s dignity, both in the objective and subjective 
sense. 
The prohibited grounds included in constitutions and human rights 
conventions not only reflect this understanding, but they provide ready-
made criteria and presumptions for courts to work with in assessing the 
nature of discrimination in any given case. Discrimination with respect to 
one of the prohibited grounds, or on the basis of analogous personal 
characteristics, will be presumptively injurious to the dignity of those 
sharing that characteristic. Moreover, and of considerable importance, in 
most such systems the discrimination need not be invidious or intentional 
in order to be a violation of the right. The law or policy creating the 
discrimination may have rational policy objectives and not be animated by 
motives based on prejudice, and yet have a negative impact and still be 
unfair in this sense and thus be a violation of the right. 
The question of fairness, and thus the issue as to whether some 
treatment constitutes discrimination, is also quite separate from the 
question of whether that treatment may still be justified for policy reasons 
that are consistent with the values of a democratic society. No right, after 
all, is absolute, and different rights will often be brought into conflict in 
particular circumstances. There may thus be compelling policy reasons, 
aimed at furthering other rights and interests, and therefore consistent with 
the principles upon which the constitution is founded, which will justify the 
violation of the right in particular circumstances. But analytically, that is 
typically a separate question, requiring considerations that are distinct from 
the inquiry into whether there was discrimination constituting a violation of 
the right to begin with. 
 
and%20Exp%20Rep.htm. For more on the European Convention on Human Rights, see PIETER VAN 
DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (4th ed. 
2006). 
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Different analytical models and legal tests have been developed by the 
courts in different liberal democracies for giving substantive meaning to 
the right as articulated in constitutional documents, and thereby 
determining what constitutes discrimination in the concrete circumstances 
of a given case, and when such discrimination may be justified. Certainly 
not all share the foregoing philosophical approach in all its particulars as a 
starting point; but if the right is to be taken seriously (to use Dworkin’s 
language),36 then the model must contain criteria for determining the basis 
upon which unequal treatment is to be deemed impermissible, who is to be 
compared with whom for the purposes of assessing the discrimination, and 
how the nature of the harm caused by the discrimination is to be assessed.37 
Moreover, on the separate question of justification, there have to be 
sufficiently objective criteria, applied within a model that is logically 
consistent with the ideas underpinning the right, for determining when the 
state may be justified in overriding the right. A simple balancing of the 
individual right against the broader benefit to the public welfare that may 
be gained in violating the right, is simply not consistent with the notion of 
rights. The public welfare will always outweigh the individual’s right, and 
the right becomes meaningless. As Dworkin has argued, there is a cost to 
respecting and protecting fundamental rights, but it is a cost that we have 
accepted as being necessary to the structure of the liberal democratic 
state.38 
A recent study by David Beatty suggests that there is in fact an 
approach to the resolution of equality rights claims that is increasingly 
common in the constitutional jurisprudence of democracies around the 
world.39 He argues that most high courts have come to rely upon a 
proportionality test, in which there is a careful evaluation of the 
relationship among the objective of the impugned government action; the 
means selected to achieve it, as reflected in the law or policy adopted for 
that purpose; and the effects of that law or policy, both in terms of the 
extent to which it actually achieves the desired objective, and the negative 
impact it has on the claimant and others similarly situated. Moreover, in 
 
 36. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 184. 
 37. Moreau makes the argument that, in most of the specific conceptions of treatment that 
constitutes discrimination that she considers, a comparison with others who may receive the benefit in 
question is not a necessary element of the analysis, although it may be helpful from an evidentiary 
perspective. Moreau, supra note 33, at 303. The courts in Canada and other jurisdictions, however, 
continue to rely on the notion of comparison with others as an essential element of the analysis of 
discrimination. See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 1259 (4th ed. 2008) (“It is the 
requirement of disadvantage that involves a comparison to others.”). 
 38. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 194, 197. 
 39. DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004). 
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this test the evaluation is not some abstract “balancing” of incommensurate 
interests. Rather, it is a factual examination, based on an evidentiary record, 
in which careful account is taken of the perspectives of the parties, paying 
particular attention to whether there are less restrictive alternatives to 
achieving the objective, and whether the law is either over or under 
inclusive in its operation.40 We will see below how these concepts operate 
in the contexts of the Canadian, American, and Japanese approaches to the 
analysis of discrimination. 
B. Modern Constitutional Approaches – The Example of Canada 
As mentioned earlier, the substantive concept of a right to equality (as 
opposed to a mere procedural notion of the right) is not merely reflected in 
recent jurisprudence around the world, but is reflected to varying degrees in 
the constitutions of a number of countries, and in the major international 
human rights conventions. It is suggested by the structure of the very text 
of the provisions purporting to provide protection for the right to equality. 
For instance, the Constitution of South Africa provides in Article 9 that: 
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
 
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
 
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection 
(3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.41 
Paragraph 3, in particular, sets out the prohibition against unfair 
discrimination, and lists the prohibited grounds of discrimination, while 
paragraph 5 makes the explicit the presumption of unfairness where any 
 
 40. Id. at 92-93, 98. 
 41. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, art. 9. 
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discrimination is based on any of the prohibited grounds.42 The equality 
rights provision in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Canadian 
Constitution is similar in its prohibition of discrimination on a number of 
explicit grounds that reflect the basis for typical prejudice and stereotyping. 
Section 15 provides: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that 
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.43 
The purpose of subsection 2 is to permit the development of 
affirmative action programs. Subsection 1 provides for the protection of the 
right to equality, and not to be discriminated against. It is instructive to note 
how both the Canadian and South African provisions provide that the 
individual is equal in relation to the law in a number of different ways—the 
Canadian clause provides for equality in four different respects, “before” 
and “under” the law, and the right to “equal protection” and “equal benefit” 
of the law, while the South African provision provides for equality 
“before” the law, and “equal protection” and “equal benefit” of the law. 
The drafting history of the Canadian Charter reflects quite clearly that this 
formulation was deliberately adopted in order to ensure that the provision 
was not interpreted as merely providing procedural protections, as the 
Canadian courts had interpreted the earlier equality rights provision in the 
Canadian Bill of Rights,44 and as well to extend beyond the equal 
 
 42. For examples of how the right to equality in the Constitution of South Africa is analyzed by its 
courts, see Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2003 (5) SA 301 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http:// 
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2003/11.html; Larbi-Odam v. Members of the Executive Council for 
Education, 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/ 
za/cases/ZACC/1997/16.html. For a more general analysis of South African rights jurisprudence, see 
Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (2008). 
 43. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms], 
section 15. 
 44. S.C. 1960, ch. 44. Section 1(b) of the Act provided “the right of the individual to equality 
before the law and the protection of the law.” For more on the reasons for the four-part formulation of 
the right, see HOGG, supra note 37 at 1240-41; Anne F. Bayefsky, Defining Equality Rights, in 
EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS 1-79 (Anne F. Bayefsky & Mary Eberts, eds. 1985); 
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protection formulation provided in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
In addition to section 15 of the Charter, it is necessary also to examine 
section 1 in order to understand the equality rights doctrine of the Canadian 
courts. For the rights analysis under the Charter is a two stage process: the 
first stage comprises an inquiry into the question of whether the 
fundamental right or freedom was violated by government action; and, in 
the event such a violation is established, the second stage comprises an 
analysis of whether the violation can be justified. That justification phase is 
governed by section 1, and the analytical framework that has been 
developed from it. Section 1 itself provides that: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.45 
Turning to how the courts have applied each of these provisions, let us 
begin with section 15. The Supreme Court of Canada established the 
fundamental contours of the right to equality and the framework for its 
analysis in the first case that raised the issue. The case involved a claim 
advanced by a non-Canadian lawyer against a law of the province of 
British Columbia that limited entry to the legal profession to citizens of 
Canada.46 The court began with an analysis of the very concept of equality, 
and how the content of the right enshrined in section 15 was to be 
interpreted. After commenting on both the importance and elusive nature of 
equality in democratic philosophy, the plurality of the court confirmed that 
the right was to be both substantive and centered on the notion of 
discrimination. It rejected as overly formalistic the Court of Appeal’s 
application of a “similarly-situated” test, which was a reformulation of the 
Aristotelian principle of equality and simply rested on the idea that persons 
who are “similarly situated be similarly treated” and persons who are 
“differently situated be differently treated.”47 Justice McIntyre, writing for 
the majority on this issue, noted that a right to equality so formulated could 
justify the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, on the grounds that all Jews 
were being treated equally under the law.48 
 
CANADA’S CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 AND AMENDMENTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Anne F. 
Bayefsky ed. 1989). 
 45. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 1. 
 46. Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
 47. Id. at 165-66. 
 48. Id. at 166. 
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Rather, the Court confirmed that the promotion of equality “entails the 
promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they 
are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, 
respect and consideration,”49 and that the focus of the right was on the 
prohibition of discrimination, which lies at the core of the right to equality. 
That is not to be taken to mean that every distinction drawn by legislation 
is prohibited, as then virtually every law would be technically caught by the 
provision. Rather, discrimination in its pejorative sense is the limiting 
feature of the provision, and the concept that shapes the contours of the 
right. Discrimination was defined as: 
A distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating 
to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such 
individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or 
limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to 
other members of society. Distinctions based on personal 
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of 
association with a group will rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and 
capacities will rarely be so classified.50 
It is important to note that the discrimination need not be intentional, 
and indeed, under section 15 a law may be discriminatory on its face, may 
be facially neutral but discriminatory in its effect upon the claimants, or be 
discriminatory solely in the manner in which it is ultimately applied.51 
Justice McIntyre went on to explain that the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination listed in section 15(1) “reflect the most common and 
probably the most socially destructive and historically practised bases of 
discrimination and must . . . receive particular attention.”52 He also made 
clear that the list of prohibited grounds was not exclusive or limited, and 
that other personal characteristics that were analogous to those listed could 
equally form the basis for a claim of discrimination in violation of the 
provision. But in order to establish that there has been discrimination on the 
basis of one of the enumerated or analogous grounds (this is the term used 
by the court, though the grounds are not, in fact, enumerated in the sub-
section), the claimant must prove not only that the impugned law has a 
“differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by 
law but, in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is 
 
 49. Id. at 171. The echoes of Dworkin here are unmistakable. 
 50. Id. at 174-75. 
 51. See HOGG, supra note 37, at 1269-72. 
 52. Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 175 (Can.). 
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discriminatory.”53 The court must therefore analyze the content of the law, 
its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies and those whom it 
excludes from application.54 
There is considerable debate within the Canadian academy, the legal 
profession, and even the judiciary, over the extent to which this test has 
evolved or been departed from over the last three decades, but in its broad 
contours, and for the purposes of our analysis here, we can accept that the 
test remains essentially unchanged. That is to say, the right continues to be 
understood to be a substantive right grounded in a Kantian notion of human 
dignity, and the focus of the analysis remains unfair discrimination based 
upon a prohibited ground of discrimination, being one of those explicitly 
articulated in section 15 or personal characteristics that are analogous 
thereto. The Supreme Court provided a reformulation of the test in a 
judgment handed down in 1999, in which it further emphasized the concept 
of injury to dignity as being the core concept in discrimination, and 
suggested that there also had to be a demonstrated inconsistency between 
the purpose of the law and the purpose of section 15.55 This was roundly 
criticized, however, as being an attempt to narrow the scope of the right 
further,56 and in a judgment in 2008, the Supreme Court backed away from 
this new element of the test, while reaffirming that the concept of dignity is 
central to the substantive content of the right, that the focus of the analysis 
is on the concept of discrimination, and generally that the essential aspects 
of the test first established in Andrews continues to be controlling.57 
All of this, however, only relates to the first phase of the analysis, 
which is the determination of whether there has been a violation of the 
right. In the event that the court determines that the right has been violated, 
as it did in the Andrews case itself, the examination moves to the question 
of justification. The analytical framework for this examination was first 
established in a case about the presumption of innocence, called R. v. 
 
 53. Id. at 182. 
 54. Id. at 171. 
 55. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.), at 
501-02. 
 56. See, e.g., Donna Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 299, 
305-10 (2001-2002); Debra M. McAllister, Section 15 — The Unpredictability of the Law Test, 15 
NAT’L J. CONST. L. 3 (2003-2004); Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, Breaking the Law’s Grip 
on Equality: A New Paradigm for Section 15, 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 33 (2003), Mayo Moran, 
Protesting Too Much: Rational Basis Review Under Canada’s Equality Guarantee, in DIMINISHING 
RETURNS: INEQUALITY AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 71 (Sheila McIntyre 
& Sanda Rodgers eds., 2006); Sheila McIntyre, Deference and Dominance: Equality Without 
Substance, in DIMINISHING RETURNS: INEQUALITY AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS 95 (Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers eds., 2006). 
 57. R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (Can.), at paras. 17-26. 
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Oakes,58 and so is generally known as the Oakes Test. It is the analytical 
framework that gives effect to section 1 of the Charter, which is to say it 
inquires into whether, in the circumstances of the case, the infringing law 
constitutes such “reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”59 It is a 
formulation that has its counterparts in European jurisprudence, and as will 
be seen below, bears many similarities to the strict scrutiny standard of 
review in the American doctrine. It also reflects the proportionality test that 
Beatty says is increasingly universal, and which he argues is the foundation 
of a common constitutional rule of law.60 Others too have suggested that 
this proportionality analysis is one of the “defining features of global 
constitutionalism.”61 
The test is a three stage analysis.62 At the outset, it is important to note 
that the onus shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law, which by 
this stage of the analysis has of course already been determined to violate a 
fundamental right or freedom, can be justified. The onus is that of the civil 
standard of proof: the balance of probabilities.63 The first stage of the test is 
to establish that the impugned government act or policy is indeed 
“prescribed by law.” If the government action is not enacted in formal 
legislation or regulation, the analysis ends here—only duly enacted law and 
policy can ever justifiably infringe a right. Put differently, there can never 
be any justification for the violation of rights by acts not authorized 
through the democratic process for promulgating law and regulation. This 
step is usually superfluous, as it was in Andrews, but it is an essential 
element in order to prevent arbitrary state action in the absence of legal 
authority. The second stage requires that the government demonstrate that 
the law serves a pressing and substantial objective, which is consistent with 
the principles and values that are integral to a free and democratic society. 
And, given the onus of proof requirement, the government has to adduce 
 
 58. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
 59. This being the language from section 1, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 43. 
 60. BEATTY, supra note 39. 
 61. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74 (2008); see also David Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 652, 695-96 (2005). 
 62. As will be seen, one of the stages itself comprises three steps, and subsequent cases have 
sometimes numbered the steps differently, such that it is sometimes described as a four-step test. 
 63. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.), at paras. 65-68. Again, there is a wealth of literature 
within Canada on the extent to which the Oakes test too has been modified by the Court over time, with 
the development of differentiated standards of proof depending on the type of case, but for our purposes 
we need not delve into such minutiae. The general framework remains essentially unchanged. 
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cogent evidence as to the exact nature of the purpose of the law, the 
importance of that purpose, and its consistency with democratic values.64 
The third stage of the test is an inquiry into the relationship between 
the means adopted by the legislation and its stated objective, which is itself 
a three part “proportionality test.” The first element of this test is to 
determine whether there is a rational connection between the stated 
objective and the means taken by the legislation. At its most basic, this 
involves an inquiry into whether the means chosen will actually result in 
the achievement of the objective. But the court will also inquire into how 
carefully tailored the legislation is to achieve the objective, and whether it 
is over or under inclusive in terms of its scope and impact. The second and 
related element is to determine whether the law constitutes the least drastic 
means of achieving the objective—in other words, whether there are any 
less restrictive alternatives, or whether the law imposes the minimum 
impairment possible on the claimant class. Finally, the third element of the 
proportionality test is to inquire into the proportionality of the actual harm 
caused to the claimant or claimant class, relative to the proposed benefit to 
be derived from achieving the legislative objective.65 
There is an inverse relationship between the “pressing and substantial 
objective” stage and the “proportionality test” stage of the test, which poses 
a dilemma for the government. The greater the level of abstraction with 
which the legislative objective is stated, the easier it is to meet the pressing 
and substantial test; but the higher the level of generality with which the 
objective is defined, the more difficult it is to demonstrate a rational 
connection between the means and the objective, and to prove that there are 
no less restrictive alternatives to achieving the objective.66 This dilemma 
was illustrated to some extent in the Andrews case. The Law Society of 
British Columbia argued that the pressing and substantial purpose of the 
law limiting entry to the legal profession to Canadian nationals was to 
ensure that lawyers, who they argued fulfill important roles within the 
governmental process, had both an adequate knowledge of local affairs, 
customs, and institutions, and that they had a sufficient commitment and 
attachment to Canada as a country. The majority of the Court accepted the 
importance of the stated objective, but held that the exclusion of non-
citizens was not rationally connected to that objective, in that citizenship 
was not a sufficiently precise proxy for either knowledge or commitment. 
 
 64. See id. para. 69. 
 65. Id. paras. 74-75. 
 66. HOGG, supra note 37, at 881-82 (analyzing section 1 and the Oakes test, and discussing this 
relationship). 
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The law was not carefully tailored to achieve the objective, and was likely 
to be both under and over inclusive, in that it would exclude foreigners who 
were both knowledgeable and committed, and permit entry to Canadians 
who were neither.67 
As was emphasized above in the explanations of the more general 
proportionality analysis, it should be noted that the Oakes test involves a 
careful evaluation of evidence as to the negative impact that the impugned 
law has on the claimant, as perceived by the claimant (or, at a minimum, by 
a reasonable person standing in the claimant’s shoes), as well as evidence 
as to the government’s actual legislative objectives, and the extent to which 
the means chosen have been carefully tailored to achieve that objective 
with minimum impairment of the rights of the claimant. In the Canadian 
model, this is perhaps more analytically rigorous by virtue of the separation 
of the two questions, beginning with a distinct inquiry into the nature of the 
discrimination and the extent of the harm to the claimant, before addressing 
the relationship between the legislative objectives, means, and the 
proportionality between the objective and impact on the claimant class. 
This two part analysis, under sections 15 and 1 of the Charter, has 
been applied since 1982 to establish a fairly robust right to equality in 
Canada. Canadian advocates remain critical of the manner in which the 
courts have enforced the right, but as will become quite apparent after a 
brief review of the American doctrine and then a more detailed analysis of 
the Japanese case law, the Canadian model provides a relatively powerful 
protection of a substantive right, with a stringent justification requirement 
for any violation. Laws that have discriminated on their face, in their 
unintended effect, or in their application, on the basis of each of the 
prohibited grounds as well as a number of analogous grounds such as 
sexual orientation, have been struck down over the years.68 When I 
examine the Japanese cases below in detail, this model will provide a 
useful comparison, and because of the similarity between the Japanese and 
Canadian constitutional provisions, I will suggest that the Canadian 
jurisprudence ought to be far more instructive for the Japanese courts than 
the American doctrine. 
 
 67. Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, (Can.), at paras. 12-16 (per Wilson, J., 
writing for the majority on this issue). 
 68. For a more detailed analysis of the right, and the various forms of discriminatory laws that 
have been struck down for violation of it, see generally HOGG, supra note 37, ch. 52. 
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C. The American Constitutional Approach to Equal Protection 
In contrast to the more detailed equality rights provisions of the 
constitutions of Japan, Canada, and South Africa, and all the international 
human rights instruments, the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is conspicuously brief and vague. It 
provides quite simply: 
Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.69 
How is this to be interpreted? What is the content and scope of “equal 
protection of the laws?” Compared to the provisions we have seen above, 
there is no assistance for the courts in developing criteria for differentiating 
between valid and invalid distinctions, or determining the basis of unfair 
discrimination. Or, to look at it another way, there is no criteria suggested 
for limiting or defining the scope of the right. Indeed, what is the 
underlying philosophical rationale for the provision? In contrast to later 
equality rights provisions, which of course were drafted with the benefit of 
learning from the American experience, the text of the first modern 
constitutional clause designed to protect equality rights itself provides no 
assistance in answering these questions. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 
decided in 1872, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the clause 
narrowly, with the determination that its purpose was fundamentally aimed 
at countering racial discrimination: “The existence of laws in the States 
where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with 
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be 
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.”70 
The scope of the provision has obviously been broadened since that 
early judgment, but race and the historical context of slavery and 
reconstruction continue to cast a long shadow over equal protection 
thinking. Moreover, the jurisprudence continues to reflect tension between 
conflicting understandings of the underlying philosophy of the provision, 
and divergent conceptions of what criteria ought to be applied by the courts 
in their judicial review of government action alleged to violate the 
provision. While we can only briefly review the approach here, for the 
 
 69. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As Laurence Tribe points out, however, the Equal Protection Clause 
is not the only provision in the constitution that operates to create equality rights, but it is the “fount of 
doctrine.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437 (2d ed. 1988). 
 70. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872). 
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purposes of our comparative analysis it is helpful to highlight the salient 
elements.71 
By the end of the twentieth century the doctrine had stabilized around 
three standards or levels of judicial scrutiny, which would be applied 
according to either the right or interest that was burdened by the impugned 
law, or the basis of the classification (that is, the distinction) that the law 
made. In this sense, the equal protection clause had been interpreted so as 
to have two distinct aspects, which may be said to lead to two different 
lines of inquiry, each of which seeks to determine the level of judicial 
scrutiny that is to be applied. Both lines of inquiry can be seen as different 
ways to define the limits of the right. These two lines are neatly captured 
by the distinction between the right to be treated equally, and the right to 
be treated as an equal.72 The right to be treated equally, the first aspect, 
only operates in respect of certain specific interests, particularly other 
fundamental rights such as the right to vote, the right to freely travel 
between states, and access to the courts and the judicial process. In other 
words, the provision only operates, in this aspect, to protect people from 
being discriminated against in a way that affects the enjoyment of one of 
these other rights. This defines the first form of limitation on the scope of 
the right, and the first line of inquiry begins with an examination of what 
rights or other interests are burdened or benefitted by the classification in 
the impugned law. 
The second aspect, the right to be treated as an equal, which is shared 
by all and not linked to any other right or interest, reflects the requirement 
that the government treat all individuals with equal concern and respect. 
This second aspect, however, is instead limited by the nature of the 
classification made by the law or policy, and the type of disadvantage that 
is imposed upon the claimant. The second line of inquiry therefore begins 
with an examination of the basis of the classification. The Supreme Court 
has over time developed the idea that classifications based on certain types 
of personal characteristics are inherently “suspect,” and established the 
principle that discrimination created by such classifications should be 
subject to closer judicial scrutiny than distinctions based on other types of 
personal characteristic. It has identified certain criteria for categorizing the 
types of classification that will be “suspect,” and three levels of scrutiny for 
analyzing specific claims based on how they are thus categorized. It is this 
 
 71. There is much literature on this subject, but for a short yet excellent review and analysis of the 
three dominant theoretical approaches to, and justifications for, judicial review, see BEATTY, supra note 
39, ch. 1. 
 72. TRIBE, supra note 69, at 1437. 
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second aspect of the right that relates more closely to the discrimination in 
the sense discussed above. 
As just mentioned, each of these two lines of inquiry is aimed at 
determining which of the three levels of review ought to be applied. The 
most relaxed level of scrutiny is a simple rationality test, which as we will 
see, shares a great deal in common with the Japanese “unreasonable 
discrimination” test. This standard is applied to cases involving distinctions 
made in socio-economic policy making, not based on any “suspect” 
classification in which no other fundamental right or interest is implicated. 
The test requires the applicant to prove that the law is not “rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate government interest.” The requirement 
that the legislative purpose be “legitimate”—both in terms of involving 
some conception of the public good, and in the fact that the purpose itself is 
not in violation of the Constitution or any laws—introduces an external 
criteria, thus avoiding a purely tautological demonstration of rationality 
between the means and ends of the law in question.73 That having been 
said, the courts have been extremely deferential to the government in the 
application of this standard, often not requiring evidence to prove the 
original purpose of the legislation, but rather engaging in speculation as to 
what might have conceivably been the legitimate purpose under the 
circumstances.74 In only a few cases has the Supreme Court held that the 
rationality test was not satisfied.75 
At the other end of the spectrum is the “strict scrutiny” standard of 
review. Before examining the content of the standard and how it is applied, 
it is best to first outline the criteria that trigger its application. First, it is 
triggered if the court determines that the classification or distinction made 
in the impugned legislation implicates some other fundamental right or 
interest. Thus, minimum residency requirements as a pre-condition to 
receiving government benefits will be subjected to strict scrutiny, because 
of the impact that the law will have on the freedom of inter-state travel.76 
This trigger relates back to the first line of inquiry, with respect to “being 
treated equally.” 
The second trigger is the determination that the classification made by 
the law is itself suspect as constituting discrimination based on prejudice 
 
 73. Id. at 1440. 
 74. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-77 (1980). 
 75. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1982); Hooper v. Bernalillo County 
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622-24 (1985). However, Tribe argues that these do not represent the standard, 
and that in fact the Burger Court was applying a heightened scrutiny in respect of classifications it felt 
were suspect but did not want to so classify. TRIBE, supra note 69, at 1444-45. 
 76. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 638-42 (1969). 
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against racial or other minorities within society. In other words, the trigger 
is based not on the interest that is affected by the law, but on the 
characteristics of the persons burdened by the law, or the personal 
characteristics that form the basis for the distinction made by the law. 
Given the historical context, race is the primary suspect classification, as 
the Supreme Court affirmed in what is perhaps the country’s most 
notorious equal protection case: 
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism 
never can.77 
In addition to race, the courts have classified a number of other bases 
for discrimination as being quasi-suspect, such that laws that make facial 
classifications based on such characteristics may be subject to strict 
scrutiny. This flows from the famous “footnote four” in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., in which Justice Stone suggested that legislation 
may be subjected to more exacting scrutiny when it is directed at 
“particular religious . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities. . . . [P]rejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”78 
The reason why such discrete and insular minorities should be 
protected, however, continues to be of considerable debate within the 
United States, and these differing perspectives impact the scope of the right 
itself. For while the theoretical perspective discussed above, as 
implemented within the Canadian constitutional model, would suggest that 
any discrimination based on some immutable characteristic shared by 
discrete and insular groups within society should be suspect on the basis 
that such discrimination is likely to be injurious to their dignity, that view 
is not dominant in American rights theory. Indeed, Justice Stone’s own 
articulation of the principle in footnote four grounds the reason in the 
political process—that is, minorities may require greater protection from 
 
 77. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The case involved a claim under the 
Fifth Amendment by Japanese-Americans who were ordered removed, by Executive Order 9066, from 
areas around the West coast of the United States during World War II, and the Supreme Court 
notoriously upheld the government policy. 
 78. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (internal citations omitted). 
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the courts because they are incapable of accessing the normal levers of 
political power within the democratic process to defend their interests. 
This “process theory” explanation of rights thus rejects the idea that 
some putative substantive content of rights, such as a Kantian notion of 
dignity, forms the foundation of a right to equality, and focuses entirely on 
whether the claimant class requires greater protection due to its inability to 
exercise political power within the democratic process. This perspective is 
grounded in the traditional position that the courts should be deferential 
towards the legislative process, and that such deference should only be set 
aside when the democratic process is itself unlikely to properly resolve 
countermajoritarian dilemmas.79 Some very prominent scholars continue to 
argue that rights jurisprudence can only be explained by some underlying 
substantive understanding of rights, but there appears to be a wider 
agreement that the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue is based 
primarily upon process theory. 80 Thus, while “immutable characteristics” 
are referred to by the Supreme Court, how and for what purpose it employs 
immutable characteristics is subject to debate, and while the concept of 
immutable characteristics has at times been relied upon by the Court in 
reaching decisions in some equal protection cases, in other cases the notion 
has been explicitly rejected.81 
The reliance upon a process theory approach to discrimination will of 
course lead to very different conclusions about what kinds of legislative 
 
 79. The foundational work on process theory is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980). As mentioned earlier, for a good analysis of the dominant contending theories, see BEATTY, 
supra note 39, ch. 1. 
 80. Ronald Dworkin remains the dominant advocate of a substantive conception of rights. See 
DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 33. See also, Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1979). But see generally Michael J. 
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991). Also, 
notwithstanding the assertion that the Court’s general approach is grounded in process theory, Kermit 
Roosevelt also makes the point that the manner in which the Court has dealt with affirmative action 
cases is not consistent with a process theory approach to equality rights: KERMIT ROOSEVELT, THE 
MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, 181-188 (2006), a book written for a non-specialist audience, but which 
nonetheless provides an elegant and precise review of the process theory analysis of these issues. 
 81. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (“Moreover, since sex, like 
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the 
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem 
to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility . . . .’”); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (rejecting 
that the immutable characteristic of mental retardation should trigger heightened scrutiny: “if the large 
and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the 
Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups 
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate 
the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the 
public at large.”). 
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distinction deserve close scrutiny, or heightened justification, as compared 
to those that a Kantian substantive rights approach would suggest. The 
most obvious illustration of this is provided by the issue of gender 
discrimination. Since women comprise a slight majority of the voting 
population, the process theorist would argue that women ought to be able to 
exercise their political power within the democratic process to protect and 
advance their unique interests, and thus should not require any particular 
protection or assistance by the courts. The process theorist might concede 
that given the likely impact of historical discrimination, and the fact that 
men continue to overwhelmingly control the government process, some 
level of protection might be required in the short-term, but generally 
speaking women as a class do not deserve any special treatment that would 
justify the courts being less deferential of the political process. A more 
substantive rights approach, of course, would suggest that the fact that 
women as a class might have access to the levers of power is not 
dispositive of the question of whether a particular legislative distinction 
constitutes a form of discrimination that is likely to injure the dignity of 
individual women in society.82 
Returning to our discussion of the doctrine itself, and the operation of 
“strict scrutiny,” there have been very few classifications aside from race 
that have been determined to be suspect, and thus requiring strict scrutiny. 
Significantly, for our consideration of two of the Japanese cases analyzed 
below, national origin or “alienage” is the one other basis of discrimination 
that has attracted strict scrutiny as a “quasi-suspect” classification. Foreign 
nationals, or “aliens,” have been described as “a prime example of, a single 
‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate.”83 The Supreme Court, however, has also 
developed a “political-function exception,” according to which 
classifications for the purpose of excluding non-nationals from positions 
that are intimately connected to the process of democratic self-government, 
are subjected to the relaxed standard of scrutiny, or minimal rationality.84 
Nonetheless, the court will look carefully at how the classification is 
tailored, and has held that evidence of either over or under inclusiveness 
will undermine the argument that there is a legitimate political function that 
 
 82. See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, supra, note 80; and 
BEATTY, supra note 39, ch. 1. For an authoritative treatment of process theory, see ELY, supra note 79. 
 83. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 84. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984). 
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is actually being protected.85 We will return to this analysis when we 
examine one of the key Japanese cases below. 
As a result of this approach to rights, a number of classifications, such 
as gender and illegitimacy, which would constitute prohibited grounds of 
discrimination under the Canadian model, and indeed the South African, 
European, and the various international law conventions, have been placed 
in something less than a suspect category. These classifications thus trigger 
an “intermediate” standard of review, which is the third level of review, 
falling between strict scrutiny and the minimum scrutiny test. Indeed, for 
some of these forms of discrimination, only the minimum scrutiny test is 
applied. Moreover, another profound difference between the American 
model and other constitutional approaches, such as Canada’s, is the 
treatment of discriminatory effect. It will be recalled that under the 
Canadian model the discrimination need not be intentional or invidious to 
ground a determination that the right to equality has been violated. That is 
not the case under the American doctrine. If it is alleged that a law creates a 
classification that, while on its face does not employ a suspect category 
(i.e., race), nonetheless has a disparate impact on members of a discrete and 
insular minority, that alone will not trigger strict scrutiny. In order to 
trigger the application of strict scrutiny the applicant must prove that that 
the law is animated, at least in part, by specific discriminatory intent. The 
fact of disparate impact may be evidence of such intent, but by itself does 
not ground the claim. What is more, discriminatory intent in this context 
means more than simply enactment with knowledge of the likely 
consequences. The claimant must prove that the law or policy was 
implemented because of, rather than in spite of, the foreseen disparate 
impact on the minority.86 
This brings us finally to the substance of the three different standards 
of review. As discussed above, the minimum scrutiny or mere rationality 
test requires only that there be a rational connection between a legitimate 
purpose of the legislation, and the means that it employs to achieve that 
purpose, which creates the impugned distinction. The minimum scrutiny 
test reflects the presumption of constitutionality and the default deference 
to the legislative process, and legislation virtually always survives 
application of the test. 
 
 85. Id. at 225-27. Justice Marshall determined that the Texas law that excluded non-nationals from 
acting as notary publics was underinclusive, since there were other positions that fulfilled similar 
functions that were not similarly protected, and he also decided that in any event notaries do not 
perform functions that “go to the heart of representative government.” Id. at 225. 
 86. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Personnel Adm. of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
MARTIN_FINAL_JCI.DOC 3/1/2010  11:14:07 AM 
2010] GLIMMERS OF HOPE 197 
The strict scrutiny test, on the other hand, is somewhat more complex. 
In one sense, it operates very much like the justification phase of the 
analysis (that is, the Oakes test) in the Canadian model. Thus, once 
triggered, the onus shifts to the government to prove that the purpose of the 
impugned legislation is compelling (analogous to the Canadian “pressing 
and substantial objective”), and that the classification or distinction that 
causes the alleged discrimination is necessary to the achievement of that 
purpose. Moreover, while the court will provide some latitude to the 
legislature, on the basis that “mathematical nicety” is not possible in the 
legislative process,87 it will examine the extent to which the law is closely 
tailored to achieve the objective, and the extent to which it exhibits any 
under or over inclusiveness. Similarly, as part of the determination of 
necessity, it will examine whether there is any less restrictive alternative to 
the discriminatory means adopted. This tracks the rational connection 
element of the Oakes test quite closely, though there is no specific 
proportionality analysis in the strict scrutiny review. Nonetheless, it is often 
said that the strict scrutiny test is strict in theory but fatal in practice, and 
indeed, few cases survive its application.88 
The strict scrutiny test is somewhat more complicated, however, 
because it is not a pure justification analysis as is the Oakes test in the 
Canadian model. The courts often employ a variant of strict scrutiny in a 
manner that suggests that it is being used to actually make the initial 
determination of whether there has been a violation of the equal protection 
clause, rather than solely as a justification analysis after the violation has 
been established.89 The details of this need not concern us here, but it is 
useful to note that, in contrast to the Canadian model, there is not quite the 
same clear demarcation of the two phases of analysis. 
Stepping back, however, and assessing the Oakes test and the strict 
scrutiny test in a broader comparative perspective, they both conform to the 
proportionality test that Beatty has found to be common to most 
constitutional democracies, and which he argues is the hallmark of the rule 
of law. That is, they both reflect a detailed evidence-based evaluation of the 
relationship among the legislative objective, the means chosen to achieve 
it, and the effects those means have on the parties—looked at from the 
perspective of the parties. The relationship between objective and means 
must be rational, and necessary, in the sense that there is no less restrictive 
 
 87. See TRIBE, supra note 69, at 1446. 
 88. Id. at 1451. 
 89. See generally Michael Helfand, How the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New 
Discrimination: Examining the Trajectory of Equal Protection Doctrine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
607, 610-12 (2009) (offering a detailed analysis of the two ways in which the standard is employed). 
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alternative; and the relationship between the objective and the impact of the 
discrimination on the claimant must be proportionate.90 
Finally, turning to the third of the three levels of review in the 
American doctrine, the intermediate standard of scrutiny requires that the 
government show that the purpose of the impugned legislation is important 
(as opposed to compelling), and that the means adopted by the law that 
makes the impugned distinction or classification, is substantially related 
(as opposed to necessary and closely tailored) to the purpose. As already 
discussed, this is employed for certain classifications that are quasi-suspect, 
such as gender, which would enjoy the same level of protection as race in 
the Canadian, South African, and other substantive rights systems. As such, 
the government can, under the American system, much more easily 
establish that discrimination based on gender and other such quasi-suspect 
classifications, is justified in the circumstances. 
In summary, the scope of the right to equal protection is considerably 
narrower than that of the equality rights in the Canadian Charter. Laws 
drawing distinctions on the basis of physical and mental disability, age, 
sexual orientation, legitimacy, and gender, have all been struck down in 
Canada as constituting unjustifiable discrimination, while all those grounds 
of discrimination still remain outside of the “suspect” class, and thus do not 
attract strict scrutiny in the American courts (unless the law based on such 
classification otherwise implicates the enjoyment of some other 
fundamental right). As such, government action discriminating on those 
grounds will generally survive judicial review in the United States. Indeed, 
of these, only gender and illegitimacy have been clearly classified as being 
deserving of intermediate scrutiny. Moreover, as discussed above, without 
proof of specific discriminatory intent, non-facial or effects based 
discrimination does not attract any heightened level of scrutiny. Thus, as 
reflected in the foregoing discussion, only one narrow aspect of the 
American approach employs the proportionality analysis that is common to 
so many other constitutional democracies, and has been argued to underpin 
the rule of law. Nonetheless, as we turn to the Japanese cases, it will be 
instructive to consider how the application of the U.S. doctrine in these 
cases might have altered the analysis, and to ponder what inference might 
be drawn about the American doctrine from an examination of the almost 
universal application of a bare rationality test by the Japanese courts. 
 
 90. While the strict scrutiny test does not explicitly require an inquiry into “proportionality” as 
does the Oakes test, the result of the inquiry into the importance of the legislative objective, how 
carefully the law has been tailored, whether it is over or under inclusive, and whether there are less 
restrictive alternatives, result in a de facto assessment of proportionality. 
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III. THE UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION TEST IN JAPAN 
As we begin to look closely at the development of the Japanese 
doctrine, I should begin with a few words on the appropriateness of 
analyzing the Japanese cases within this comparative framework. The 
argument that this is some illegitimate imposition of “western values” can 
be anticipated. But the concept of equality discussed above should not be 
understood as some “western” notion of equality that is somehow foreign 
to Japanese legal thinking. To the extent that any system aspires to 
constitutional democracy founded on liberal democratic values, including 
the rule of law, it must necessarily protect the right to equality. Equality is 
increasingly seen as a fundamental component of the concept of justice 
itself.91 Moreover, the notion that certain rights transcend and exist 
independent of mere positive law, and that their violation can only be 
justified in accordance with a strict proportionality analysis, is central to 
most robust explanations of the rule of law.92 And finally, in contrast to the 
original German notion of Rechtsstaat (literally “state based on law”) that 
comprised one of the fundamental principles of the earlier Constitution of 
the Empire Japan (1898), the Anglo-American conception of the rule of 
law is central to the understanding of the 1947 Constitution of Japan.93 
Many of the doyens of Japanese constitutional law have remarked on 
the necessity to develop criteria for the interpretation of Article 14 that are 
consistent with the values of a free and democratic society and which 
recognize the dignity of the human being.94 The problem is primarily that 
the courts have failed to do so. The Human Rights Committee under the 
ICCPR, in its observations on the periodic reports submitted by Japan, has 
repeatedly criticized the analytical model employed by courts in assessing 
discrimination as being inconsistent with Japan’s obligations to enforce the 
right to equality under the ICCPR. In particular, it has expressed concern 
over “the vagueness of the concept of ‘reasonable discrimination,’ which, 
in the absence of objective criteria, is incompatible with article 26 of the 
Covenant,” and about “the restrictions that can be placed on the rights 
guaranteed in the Covenant on the grounds of ‘public welfare,’ a concept 
that is vague and open-ended and which may permit restrictions exceeding 
 
 91. See RAWLS, supra note 33, at 441-49; KYMLICKA, supra note 33, at 56. 
 92. BEATTY, supra note 39, at 162; see generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, The Rule of Law as the 
Rule of Liberal Principle, in RONALD DWORKIN 56 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007); DAVID DYZENHAUS, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006). 
 93. Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and 
Japan, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 62-65 (1990). 
 94. MIYAZAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II, supra note 3; ASHIBE, READING, supra note 11, at 
136-40; SATŌ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 477-83. 
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those permissible under the Covenant.”95 An examination of how the courts 
analyze discrimination illustrates the validity of these observations, 
although we will focus primarily on the issue of “reasonable 
discrimination.” 
A. The Patricide Case 
The Supreme Court established in the first equality cases that, 
notwithstanding the unqualified language of Article 14, only discrimination 
that was “unreasonable” or that lacked “rationality” (gōrisei, which can be 
translated as either “reasonableness” or “rationality”) was prohibited by the 
Constitution. It did not elaborate criteria for determining what made any 
given discriminatory law or policy reasonable, but the subsequent 
jurisprudence reveals that it is simply to be assessed by reference to the 
objectives and means of the law or policy in question. In comparison to the 
Canadian model and the American strict scrutiny test, and the 
proportionality analysis examined above, there is both a failure to assess 
the legitimacy or relative importance of the legislative objective, or the 
nature of the discrimination and its actual impact on the claimant. Of the 
triad of objective, means, and effects, the Japanese test does not impose any 
external criteria for assessing the first, and it entirely ignores the third.  
It is instructive to begin our discussion with what is probably the most 
famous equality rights case in Japan, and one of only a handful of decisions 
in which the Supreme Court has actually held a law to be unconstitutional. 
The so-called Patricide case of 1973 involved Article 200 of the Criminal 
Code,96 which provided for a harsher sentence for the murder of a lineal 
ascendant than the punishment for the murder of anyone else, as provided 
for in Article 199. The maximum punishments stipulated by the two 
provisions were the same, but the minimum possible sentences available 
under the two provisions, in practical terms, was a minimum of a 3 year 
sentence for an Article 200 conviction, and a conditional discharge for 
murder under Article 199.97 The issue had come before the Supreme Court 
before, and the distinction made by the law had been upheld.98 In the case 
 
 95. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Committee (Japan), UN. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.102, at paras. 8, 11, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ 
5a2baa28d433b6ea802566d40041ebbe?Opendocument. 
 96. KEIHŌ [Penal Code], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 200. Article 200 has since been repealed, 
though this did not happen until 1995 (Law No. 91, 1995), more than 20 years after the decision of the 
court holding it to be unconstitutional. 
 97. Patricide Case, (Sup. Ct. April l4, 1973), 27 KEISHŪ 3 265, translated in BEER AND ITOH, 
supra note 12, at 146. 
 98. Supreme Court Judgment, First Petty Bench (May 24, 1956), 10 Keishu 5 734. 
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that arrived before the court in 1973, however, the accused presented a 
tragic set of facts, having been the victim of a violent incestuous 
relationship with her father from the age of 14, and having borne five of his 
children before she finally killed him. 
The majority of the court held that Article 200 was unconstitutional on 
the grounds that the disparity between the two punishments (for murder of 
an ascendant and murder simpliciter) was too great, such that the harshness 
of the punishment for patricide was disproportionate to the legislative 
objective, and so made the discrimination itself “unreasonable.” That 
answered the question the court initially posed as being the issue in the 
case: “whether Article 200 of the Criminal Code violates the said clause of 
the Constitution [Article 14]; and [this issue] is to be settled based on a 
determination of whether or not the discrimination has reasonable 
grounds.”99 In trying to identify the legislative purpose, the court noted the 
ideological background of Confucian values regarding filial piety, and the 
extended family system that had been abolished immediately following 
World War II. Ultimately, the court found that the legislative purpose was 
to maintain and protect the respect and gratitude that people ought to have 
for their ascendants. It held that it was not unreasonable for the law to treat 
the murderers of ascendants differently, but that the harshness of the 
punishment for killing an ascendant, as compared to that for other murders, 
was disproportionate and thus unreasonable. A strong concurring judgment 
written by Justice Tanaka dissented on this latter point, holding that the 
differential treatment was itself unconstitutional.100 
At first blush this case is difficult to understand from a traditional 
perspective on equality rights. In part, this is because the court never 
addressed the question of what, precisely, constitutes the discrimination in 
the case. It was assumed as given that Article 200 is discriminatory, but the 
court never applied any criteria for assessing what harm is caused by the 
differentiated treatment or how it is unfair, or who the accused is to be 
compared with for the purposes of the equality analysis. Most of the 
discussion relating to any comparison deals with the different punishments 
required by the law for the two groups of murders. But are we really to 
understand that the accused claims that she, and all other murderers of 
ascendants, are being treated unfairly as compared to “regular” murderers? 
Are we comparing two groups of murderers for the purpose of assessing 
the unequal treatment? That, quite obviously, cannot be right, and the 
 
 99. Patricide Case, at 144. (first insertion added; second insertion in original). 
 100. Id. at 150-56 (per Tanaka, J., concurring). 
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significance of the distinction does not lie in how it treats two groups of 
convicted criminals based on different definitions of their crimes. 
The case can only be understood in terms of the legislative objective 
of holding out ascendants as deserving greater respect and concern than 
descendants within the family organization, rather than the differentiated 
treatment of persons accused of murder based on their relationship with 
their victims. The law, as the court itself recognized, was attempting to 
foster and preserve a culture of enhanced respect for ascendants, and on its 
face communicated to society that the killing of an ascendant was morally 
more pernicious than the killing of one’s descendant. It suggested that 
killing one’s mother is morally worse than killing one’s child, and the law 
created, through its deterrence power, stronger protections for ascendants 
than it did for descendants. 
We are all descendants at one stage of our lives, and most of us will be 
ascendants at a later stage, and many will be both simultaneously for part 
of their lives. Thus, it may not strike us that one’s status as ascendant or 
descendant is the type of immutable characteristic upon which we would 
say that different treatment amounts to unjust discrimination. Yet in a very 
real sense the law suggested that, in any given family relationship, the life 
of the parent was of greater worth than that of the children or 
grandchildren. This was quite consistent with the underlying philosophy of 
the Ie system conception of the family that was established in Imperial 
Japan,101 and the Confucian values from which that system had been 
developed. Justice Tanaka clearly had this in mind when he wrote in his 
reasons that the creation of special protection for ascendants is “based on a 
kind of status morality” that is likely to be “repugnant to the fundamental 
idea of democracy based upon the dignity and equality of individuals.”102 
The discrimination, therefore, lies not in the difference in the 
treatment of a specific accused based on her relationship with her victim, 
but rather in the lesser protection (through lesser deterrence) provided to 
descendants under the law than that provided to ascendants. Descendants 
were not being treated equally by the law in their capacity as potential 
victims, and the law signaled that they were worthy of less respect and 
concern than ascendants generally. The distinction drawn by the law was 
 
 101. The Ie (literally meaning “house” or “home”) system was one which, in its broadest and 
rhetorical sense, characterized the entire nation as one hierarchical family, with the Emperor at its head 
as a benevolent patriarch. In legal terms, it codified the hierarchical structure within the extended 
family, with a patriarch as the head of the household. The family law in the Civil Code was 
significantly revised during the Occupation to “democratize” it and, in particular, provide for equality 
between the sexes. See, e.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW, ch. 16 (2nd ed. 1999). 
 102. Patricide Case, at 152 (per Tanaka, J., concurring). 
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between ascendants and descendants within the family relationship, and the 
harm caused was to the dignity of the descendants, in both the objective 
and subjective sense of the word, in their relations within the family, rather 
than between the murderers based on who they killed, or the severity of the 
penal sanction that was actually meted out to the rare accused in a patricide 
case. 
Had the court more deliberately explored and clearly articulated the 
nature of the comparison, and thus what in precise terms constituted the 
discrimination, it might well have come to a different conclusion on the 
question of the validity of the legislative objective. It almost certainly 
would have led to different reasoning (though not a different conclusion) 
regarding the “reasonableness” of the discrimination. For once the essence 
of the discrimination and the harm it caused becomes clear, and the 
distinction that is really being impugned has been isolated, then it becomes 
equally clear that the extent of the relative harshness of the punishment is 
really beside the point. While the court’s reasoning is cast in terms that 
resemble the standard “rational connection” and “proportionality analysis” 
within justification arguments, it does not make sense in the context of the 
actual discrimination at issue.103 Any harsher treatment of a convicted 
accused based on her status of being a descendant of the victim, designed 
to create greater deterrence against attacks on ascendants and thus to foster 
the notion that the lives of ascendants are worth more than those of 
descendants, would be illegitimate, and variations in the levels of harshness 
of the punishment do not constitute greater or lesser degrees of 
discrimination. Focusing on the severity of the punishment here is akin to 
questioning just how far back on the bus one has to be required to sit, for 
race-based segregated seating to become illegitimate. 
While the court ended up concluding that the provision was 
unconstitutional, it did so on the grounds that the discrimination was 
“unreasonable.” The only criteria offered for that finding was that there 
was a lack of proportionality between the objective of the legislation and 
the harshness of the means adopted to achieve it. But this should not be 
confused with a “less restrictive alternative” or “minimal impairment” 
argument. Because the court did not quibble with the means in and of 
itself—that is the imposition of a different punishment for killing an 
ascendant. The court did not suggest that the objective ought to be pursued 
through a different avenue that differentiates between ascendants and 
 
 103. But see Charles Qu Ba, Patricide, Proportionality and Equality: Japanese Courts’ Attitude 
Towards the Equality Principle as Reflected in Aizawa v. Japan, 8(2) MUR. U.E.J.L. (2001) (while 
critical of the reasoning of the court, he argues that the majority decision was implicitly employing the 
proportionality principle). 
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descendants to a lesser degree. It merely questioned the harshness of the 
punishment and mistakenly identified that as the means for achieving the 
legislative objective. Varying the harshness in no way alters the nature of 
the discrimination. Moreover, the Court suggested no specific criteria for 
assessing the “reasonableness” of the actual discrimination and placed no 
importance on evaluating the effect of the discrimination on the claimant 
and those similarly situated.104 
This lack of any clearly defined criteria for determining what 
constitutes “reasonable discrimination,” and in particular the failure to 
access either the impact of the discrimination, or the legitimacy of the 
legislative objectives relative to fundamental constitutional values, 
constitutes the central weakness of the judicial model. Without external 
objective criteria the notion of “reasonable discrimination” simply relies on 
the court concluding that the government policy, taken on its own terms, 
has some rational basis. Depending on the level of generality at which the 
argument is pitched, establishing a rational connection between means and 
ends is not only easy to do, but when there is no inquiry into the legitimacy 
or importance of the objective, it can in fact be entirely tautological.105 
Moreover, this approach collapses and conflates the two distinct aspects of 
rights analysis—the first being the nature of the distinction being made and 
whether it is unfair and causes harm so as to constitute discrimination, and 
the second being whether such discrimination (if such has been 
determined) can be justified. By collapsing the analysis and focusing 
primarily on the justification, without first analyzing the nature of the 
discrimination and how it may violate the right, the justification analysis 
cannot be handled with any substantive precision. 106 In particular, and 
 
 104. Ashibe, in his analysis of the case, disagrees with the majority decision, but applauds what he 
suggests is a nuanced and sophisticated distinction between the legislative objective and the means of 
achieving it. But as argued here, the court was wrong in considering the difference in severity of 
punishment as being the means of achieving the objective that constituted the discriminatory treatment. 
ASHIBE, READING, supra note 11, at 140-41. 
 105. Hidenori Tomatsu has suggested that the Supreme Court has quite consciously limited itself to 
a “mild scrutiny” or rationality test with respect to equality, because the court recognizes that it would 
be difficult to obtain compliance from the executive and legislative branches of government. Hidenori 
Tomatsu, Equal Protection of the Law, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 187, 202 (Percy R. Luney, 
Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
 106. The inadequacy of the standard of review is recognized by Japanese constitutional scholars, 
although, as discussed earlier, Japanese scholarship would benefit from looking at jurisprudence from 
such courts as those of Canada, South African, and the European Court of Human Rights. As discussed 
earlier, there is a tendency among Japanese academics looking at this issue to focus exclusively on the 
U.S. experience, and the Japanese “reasonable discrimination” test resembles the minimum scrutiny 
“rational basis” level of review. For examples of Japanese constitutional discussion of the standards, see 
MATSUI, supra note 3, at 364; ASHIBE, READING, supra note 11, at 136; ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL, 
supra note 3, at 125. Ashibe, one of the most influential constitutional scholars of the last generation in 
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looked at from the perspective of the more general proportionality analysis, 
the “unreasonable discrimination” test fails utterly to analyze and evaluate 
how the discrimination affects the claimant or others similarly situated. 
Indeed, the benefit of the bifurcated analysis of the Canadian approach is 
that the initial examination of the precise nature of the discrimination helps 
to isolate and bring into stark relief the harm that is caused to the claimant 
class within society, against which the proportionate importance of the 
objective can then be assessed in the justification phase. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court did not hold another law to be unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it was discriminatory in violation of Article 14, until 
2008.107 The vast majority of lower court decisions have followed the 
model of the Supreme Court in finding that alleged discrimination is 
“reasonable” in the circumstances. Moreover, as we will see, the test has 
been applied by the courts in adjudicating discrimination claims in the 
private sphere, where the values underlying Article 14 have informed the 
analysis, upholding discrimination by corporations and other entities on the 
grounds that it was “reasonable” in light of the circumstances and the 
entity’s policy objectives. Before looking at cases in the private domain, 
however, we should address a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, 
which is also an important case for understanding how the “unreasonable 
discrimination” test is applied in cases involving more typical 
discrimination, against true discrete and insular minorities who have a 
history of disadvantage. It is particularly instructive for assessing how the 
rights of foreigners, including the second and third generation Korean 
permanent residents of Japan, are protected within the framework of this 
test. 
A. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government Case 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government case of January 26, 2005, 
involved the claims of discrimination asserted by a Japanese-born Korean 
woman, a permanent resident of Japan, who was a local public employee 
 
Japan, has long been a champion of introducing the levels of review employed in the American courts, 
even though he is a proponent of substantive rights theory. Of the better known Japanese scholars, only 
Matsui is clearly a process theory advocate. As a doctoral student, he studied under the supervision of 
John H. Ely. 
 107. The Supreme Court has twice held the disparity in the ratio of voters per candidate as between 
rural and urban federal political ridings to be unconstitutional under article 14, although it did not 
purport to find the election law itself unconstitutional in either case. 
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within the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.108 While a Korean national, 
her mother was Japanese, and like most second and third generation 
Koreans in Japan, she had special-permanent resident status. She was a 
healthcare professional already employed by the Tokyo government, and 
she sought to take the exams that qualified employees for promotion to 
managerial level. She was twice denied on the grounds that only Japanese 
nationals were entitled to take the exams (the first time she was denied 
there was no formally promulgated policy; by the following year, when she 
was again denied, the policy had been formalized).109 The employee sued 
the Tokyo government for violation of, among other things, Article 3 of the 
Labour Standards Law and Article 14 of the Constitution. The Tokyo High 
Court granted her partial relief, on the grounds that foreigners are protected 
by the equality rights of Article 14, the policy of the Tokyo government 
was discriminatory, and the impugned policy was overly broad and not the 
least restrictive means of achieving its stated objectives.110 The government 
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted the appeal and overturned the 
decision of the Tokyo High Court. 
It is apparent from the reasons of the Supreme Court that the Tokyo 
government had argued that the discriminatory policy was necessary 
because the government had developed an “integrated management 
appointment system,” whereby all employees who were promoted to 
certain managerial rank would become eligible for managerial positions 
throughout the government apparatus. Some of those managerial positions 
exercised “public authority”. The Supreme Court accepted that the whole 
system was predicated upon the idea that once having passed the exams the 
applicant would be eligible to work in a post with “public authority,” even 
 
 108. While one might be tempted to use the term Korean-Japanese, or Japanese-Korean, there is no 
standard practice of so calling second and third generation immigrants to Japan. In Japanese the term 
zainichi kankokujin, meaning quite literally “Korean in Japan” is used (and zainichi chōsenjin to denote 
more specifically those descendants of North Koreans in Japan). There are over 600,000 Koreans in 
Japan, many descendants of Koreans who were forcibly brought to Japan during the period of Japan’s 
colonial control of the Korean peninsula. KOREAN OVERSEAS INFO. SERVICE, KOREA-JAPAN WORKING 
SUMMIT IN SEOUL 3 (2006) available at http://www.korea.net/korea/attach/D/03/123_en.pdf. There is a 
considerable literature on the discriminatory treatment of Koreans in Japan. See, e.g., Yasuaki Onuma, 
Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal Standards of Human Rights: A Case Study on the 
Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515 (1992); CHANGSOO LEE & GEORGE DE VOS, 
KOREANS IN JAPAN: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION (1981); ONUMA YASUAKI, ZAINICHI 
KANKOKU-CHŌSENJIN NO KOKUSEKI TO JINKEN [The Nationality and Human Rights of Koreans in 
Japan] (2004). 
 109. As will be discussed more fully below, the “policy” was never actually promulgated by 
ordinance or regulation duly passed by the Tokyo government, and, not having been prescribed by law, 
one would expect such a “policy” to be treated with heightened suspicion. 
 110. Tokyo High Court Judgment, (November 26, 1997) (Tokyo Metropolitan Government case) 
[hereinafter Tokyo Metro. Gov’t case, High Ct.] 
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though the applicant had sought to take specialized exams related only to 
her health profession, and was seeking to work in an area that did not 
exercise such “public authority.” The term “public authority” had precise 
legal significance, flowing from Article 15 of the Constitution. Article 15 
provides for the rights of suffrage and sovereignty of the people, and the 
Court reaffirmed prior interpretations of this provision as meaning that only 
Japanese nationals could hold office as local government employees with 
“public authority.” Therefore, because the integrated management system 
operated so as to make all managers eligible for positions that exercised 
public authority, and given the necessity of restricting employees with 
public authority to Japanese nationals, the Court held that the Tokyo 
government’s policy of excluding all foreign nationals from promotion to 
managerial status was reasonable.111 At first blush, this may appear quite 
similar to the “political function” exception in the American treatment of 
alienage cases that we saw earlier.112 
The Article 15 sovereignty argument is highly questionable, but is 
beside the point for our purposes.113 Assuming it to be correct, the 
reasoning of the court in finding that the Tokyo government policy was 
“reasonable” still reflects the acute weakness of the unreasonable 
discrimination test as a means of giving effect to the right to equality. The 
ratio of the case may be found in section 4(2) of the majority opinion, in 
which the court held that: 
It follows that where an ordinary local public body establishes such an 
integrated management appointment system and then takes a measure 
to allow only Japanese employees to be promoted to managerial posts, 
the ordinary local public body is deemed to distinguish between 
employees who are Japanese nationals and those who are foreign 
residents based on reasonable grounds, so it is appropriate to construe 
 
 111. Supreme Court Judgment, (January 26, 2005), 59 MINSHŪ 1 128, (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government case) [hereinafter Tokyo Metro. Gov’t case, Sup. Ct.) majority opinion, at section 4. 
 112. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984); supra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
 113. Article 15 provides that: “The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials 
and to dismiss them. (2) All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group 
thereof. (3) Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to election of public officials. (4) In all 
elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or 
privately, for the choice he has made.” Nihonkoku Kenpō [Constitution of Japan] art. 15. It is very 
difficult to see how a plain reading of this provision can give rise to a principle that limits all exercise of 
“public authority” to Japanese nationals. Even if “the people” [kokumin] is interpreted here to mean 
“Japanese citizens,” which would be to give the same word two very different meanings in two 
provisions of the same document, the provision still can only be read as limiting the right to choose 
public officials to Japanese citizens, rather than saying anything at all about the right to serve as a 
public official. 
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such measure not to be a violation of Article 3 of the Labour Standards 
Law or Article 14 para 1 of the Constitution.114 
The Court merely accepted that it is within the discretion of a local 
public body “to establish, based on its own judgment, an integrated 
management appointment system.” So, there was no discussion as to the 
importance or necessity of having a comprehensive system in which 
everyone promoted to management level would be eligible for later 
appointment to positions of “public authority.” Indeed the policy objective 
was never clearly articulated by the court. There was no analysis as to 
whether the policy of limiting promotion to Japanese nationals, or the 
feature of making all managers eligible for positions with “public 
authority,” was rationally connected to the policy objectives. There was no 
analysis of whether the objectives, whatever they might be, were legitimate 
or consistent with the values of a democratic society, or whether they could 
be achieved through means that would be less discriminatory. The Tokyo 
High Court, for instance, had reasoned that a narrower policy could be 
fashioned, whereby foreigners could be promoted to managerial rank but 
restricted from transfer to positions wielding public authority. That 
argument was rejected in the majority decision of the Supreme Court 
without any analysis as to how such an adjustment of the personnel 
procedures would impact on the achievement of the overall policy 
objectives of the system. 
Indeed, the court did not discuss the effects of the policy in any way, 
in terms of either its positive or negative impact. Most significantly, it did 
not evaluate the nature of the discrimination or the harm that it might 
occasion. There was no examination of what stereotypes might underlie the 
policy of excluding foreigners, the power imbalances it might perpetuate, 
or the extent to which it might deeply harm the dignity, both objective and 
subjective, of all foreigners resident in Japan. Once again, as in the 
Patricide case, the issue of discrimination and the violation of the right 
were collapsed into and lost within the justification argument. The 
decision, boiled down to its essentials, was simply this: (1) only Japanese 
nationals may fulfil positions of public authority; (2) under the integrated 
management system of the government, all those promoted to management 
rank may fill positions of public authority; (3) therefore the policy of 
excluding foreigners from promotion to management rank is reasonable. 
Moreover, when one goes on to examine the concurring opinions of 
several of the other justices, there is even further reason to query how the 
 
 114. Tokyo Metro. Gov’t case, Sup. Ct., (Sup. Ct. January 26, 2005), 59 MINSHŪ 1 128, majority 
opinion at section 4(2) (Unofficial Court translation). 
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court approaches the issue of equality rights. Justices Ueda, Kanatani, and 
Fujita, in three separate opinions, each addressed the question of whether 
the Constitution “guarantees foreign nationals the right to take office as 
government employees,” as though this was indeed the operative 
constitutional question in the case. They completely failed to address the 
question that was in fact before the court, which is whether a public policy 
that treats foreigners differently by denying them promotion within the 
municipal government service, constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, and unjustifiably violates the right to be treated equally under 
the law. Justice Fujita went so far as to suggest that the right to equality is 
not an “inherent right” in any event, writing that “freedom of choice in 
employment, the principle of equality, etc. are rights to freedom, which are 
originally intended to only protect inherent rights and freedoms from 
restrictions, rather than creating rights and freedoms that are not 
inherent.”115 This reflects an understanding of Article 14 as being a purely 
procedural right, designed merely to govern the operation of other 
substantive rights enshrined in the Constitution, despite the fact that Article 
14 was intended to be, and has been clearly interpreted as being, a 
substantive free-standing right to be treated as an equal and not to be 
discriminated against. In any event, in the final analysis all three justices 
ultimately addressed the issue as one of government discretion, and 
whether the integrated management appointment system and the policy 
excluding foreigners went “beyond the bounds of legally acceptable 
personnel policy.”116 
Justice Fujita in a sense put his finger on the very crux of the issue of 
the policy objectives. In discussing the Tokyo High Court’s consideration 
of less restrictive means, Justice Fujita wrote that if such special personnel 
considerations were required of local government in developing their 
policies (i.e., requiring them to assess who could be transferred to positions 
of public authority), it would harm the flexibility of the personnel 
management systems.117 Thus, for him the objective was one of 
maximizing administrative flexibility, and the issue was one of balancing 
the fundamental right to equality on the one hand, and mere administrative 
efficiency and convenience on the other.118 
 
 115. Id., concurring opinion of Justice Fujita, section 2. 
 116. Id., concurring opinion of Justice Fujita, section 3, opinion of Justice Kanatani, section 3, and 
opinion of Justice Ueda, section 3. 
 117. Id., concurring opinion of Justice Fujita, section 3. 
 118. As discussed further below, there are two strong dissents in the decision. For the purposes of 
comparison, it may be useful to examine the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Lavoie v. Canada, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (Can.), and that of the South African Constitutional Court in Larbi-Odam, supra 
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It is helpful to consider how the issues in this case would be 
considered within the Canadian framework. The analysis would begin with 
an examination of the nature of the discrimination, and an assessment of 
whether it violated the right to equality. For that purpose it would start with 
an inquiry into how the distinction drawn by the policy operated, in order 
to determine whether it constituted unfair discrimination. The distinction 
here was based on nationality, a prohibited ground of discrimination (a 
ground held to be analogous to the enumerated prohibited grounds) under 
both the Canadian Charter and the Japanese Constitution. Under Article 14 
of the Constitution of Japan, this distinction thus constituted discrimination 
in “economic relations,” on the basis of an analogous prohibited ground of 
discrimination, and thereby fell squarely within the prohibition of the 
provision. The distinction discriminated in a manner that deprived non-
nationals such as the applicant of the opportunity for advancement within 
the government service, and effectively denied them employment in the 
public service (for who would begin a career in which promotion is 
impossible?). 
The discrimination was based on a personal characteristic that is tied 
closely to identity, one shared by a discrete and insular minority that has a 
history of disadvantage in Japanese society, and which has very limited 
access to the levers of political power. Moreover, the discriminatory policy 
effectively communicated to the society at large that nonnationals, even 
Japanese-born permanent residents such as the applicant, are somehow less 
worthy of trust, respect and concern than are Japanese nationals. The policy 
thus affected all nonnationals, not simply those already in the employment 
of the Tokyo Metropolitan government, or even all those who might aspire 
to such employment. As such, viewed in its totality, the harm caused by 
this discrimination was significant and went directly to the dignity of the 
applicant and all other foreigners resident in Japan. 
The next step, as discussed earlier, would be to examine whether such 
a violation could be justified in a manner that was consistent with the 
democratic values enshrined in the Constitution. Under the Oakes test, the 
policy in this case could not have survived the first step, the determination 
of whether the discrimination was “prescribed by law.” It will be recalled 
 
note 42, as the issue in both cases was the validity of government personnel policies which used 
nationality as one criterion for decision making with respect to advancement (Lavoie) and hiring (Larbi-
Odam). Both courts found the policies to be discriminatory, although the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Lavoie found that the federal government promotion policy, which contained a preference for Canadian 
nationals in one of the two streams for advancement, constituted an infringement of the fundamental 
right that was nonetheless justifiable in a free and democratic society under the Oakes test. The case has 
been heavily criticized in Canada, but the approaches of both the majority and the dissents are very 
interesting to compare to that in the Tokyo Metro. Gov’t case, Sup. Ct. 
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that the policy of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in this case was not 
a law, ordinance, or any other product of the legitimate law-making process 
of government or valid democratic procedure. The first time it was applied 
to deny the applicant the opportunity to write the exam, it had never even 
been reduced to writing. But even if the policy had been prescribed by law, 
it is difficult to imagine how it could ever be justified. 
Under the Canadian analysis, the next stage of the analysis would be 
to determine whether the objective was sufficiently important, in terms that 
were consistent with the values of a free and democratic society. The 
objective, which was identified as being to avoid placing limits on the 
integrated personnel appointment system and to maintain administrative 
flexibility, could not possibly be of sufficient importance to so grievously 
violate a fundamental constitutional right.119 And again, even if one were to 
accept that the objective was sufficiently “pressing and substantial,” the 
policy could not survive the rational connection and proportionality 
analysis. As held by Tokyo High Court, and indeed by the dissenting 
judges of the Supreme Court (whose opinions we will return to below), the 
blanket prohibition was overinclusive and by no stretch of the imagination 
the least restrictive alternative to achieving the stated objectives of the 
policy. Nor was the benefit to be derived, namely, unspecified 
administrative flexibility and efficiencies, in any way proportionate to the 
profound harm caused to the foreign employees of the government, and to 
all foreigners in Japan. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government policy would also have been 
unlikely to survive under the American approach. It will be recalled that 
discrimination on the basis of nationality is a quasi-suspect class that has 
often attracted strict scrutiny. Even in those cases in which the “political 
function” exception is raised, the courts will examine closely the legitimacy 
of the claim, and the extent to which the exclusion is carefully tailored. 
This is reflected in the reasons of Justice Marshall in the case of Bernal v. 
Fainter,120 which involved a Texas law that prohibited non-Americans 
from being qualified as Notary Publics. The Court struck down the law. 
First, it found that the role of notaries was not so central to the political 
process so as to be subject to the “political function” exception, and thus 
 
 119. It might be argued that the objective was, defined more broadly, to prevent foreigners from 
being appointed to positions of public authority, in accordance with Article 15 of the Constitution. But 
this argument assumes, without question or analysis, the necessity and legitimacy of the “integrated 
management personnel system,” and more specifically the necessity that all people promoted to 
managerial level be eligible for “public authority” positions. This argument, therefore, is circular, 
assuming the very thing that has to be proved. 
 120. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984). 
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strict scrutiny applied. Then, in applying strict scrutiny, the court held that 
the law was both underinclusive (because there were other professional 
positions fulfilling similar roles that were not so limited to American 
nationals), and overinclusive (because in seeking to guard against some 
foreign notaries who might be insufficiently familiar with Texas law, it 
excluded all resident aliens, many of whom would be sufficiently familiar 
with the law).121 On that reasoning, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
policy would have been excluded from any “political function” exception 
due to it too being overly inclusive, since it included people, like the 
applicant, who were seeking promotion to specialized positions that had 
nothing to do with “public authority”; and once having been so excluded 
from the exception, the policy would likely fail the strict scrutiny test for 
the same reasons it would fail the Oakes test. 
B. The Sumitomo Cement Case 
Turning to the private sector, we will see that while the test can be 
used to reach different results, it provides no real protection against 
discrimination in this realm either. The values underlying the right to 
equality in Article 14 have been used by the courts to inform equality rights 
issues in private litigation. It has done so most famously in the line of cases 
in which the courts greatly advanced the right of women not to be 
discriminated against with respect to termination and retirement in the 
employment context. As mentioned earlier, the courts did so using Article 
14 as a basis upon which to interpret vague provisions of the Civil Code. In 
the seminal case that began this judicial advance of women’s rights, 
decided in 1966 and known as the Sumitomo Cement case,122 the Tokyo 
District Court’s reasoning on the issue of the reasonableness of the 
discrimination stands in stark contrast to the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case. 
The company argued that it was entirely reasonable to require women 
to retire earlier than men (upon marriage, to be more precise), because 
under the lifetime employment and seniority-based pay system, women 
became less and less efficient in terms of the value of their labor relative to 
their cost to the company as time went on. This, of course, was because the 
system also entailed employing women in secretarial, clerical, and other 
forms of low-value employment, with no prospects for advancement, while 
 
 121. Id. at 226-27. 
 122. Tokyo District Court Judgment, (December 20, 1966), 17 Rōmin 6 1407 (Sumitomo Cement 
case). For an excellent analysis of the so-called first phase of women’s rights litigation over 
employment issues, see UPHAM, SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 2, ch. 4. 
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men were employed in upwardly mobile career paths. But under the 
seniority-based pay system they all received salary increases in step, and 
women over time became more costly than the value added by their career-
limited labor, and so mandatory retirement upon marriage was a “rational” 
means of keeping the labor costs of female employees down. 
The similarities in form between this argument and that of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government in respect of its integrated management 
appointment system are quite striking. So long as one accepted the 
objectives of the personnel system created by the discriminating entity as 
being necessary and sacrosanct, then the discrimination in accordance with 
the terms and in furtherance of the objectives of that system was, 
tautologically, “rational.” But the Tokyo District Court would have none of 
Sumitomo Cement’s argument. It held that, to the extent women were less 
efficient than men in the workplace, it was an inefficiency caused by the 
manner in which they were employed and by the seniority-based pay 
system itself. The inefficiency having been the result of the company’s own 
policies, the company could not rely on such inefficiency as the basis for 
explaining the rationality of its discrimination.123 The same form of 
argument could, of course, have applied with equal force in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government case. 
Nonetheless, the court in the Sumitomo Cement case did repeat in its 
reasons that only “unreasonable discrimination” was prohibited, and it 
simply turned the company’s reasonableness argument on its head. Where 
it differed from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case and others like it, 
is that the court examined the importance of the policy objectives, and the 
legitimacy of the assumptions upon which those objectives were based. 
Indeed, in a very real sense, this case and the other gender-based 
employment cases that followed it show just how malleable the 
“reasonableness” analysis is to manipulation and result-oriented reasoning 
in either direction. But what is most significant to note for our purposes, is 
that the “unreasonable discrimination” analysis established by the Supreme 
Court in respect of Article 14 cases, has been carried over to the private 
sector discrimination cases that were informed by the values of Article 14. 
Thus, even most recently in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case 
examined above, the Court held that the “reasonableness” of the 
discrimination meant that the policy violated neither the Constitution nor 
Article 3 of the Labour Standards Law, thereby importing an 
“unreasonableness” requirement to proving discrimination where none is 
 
 123. Id. For a discussion of the case see UPHAM, SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 2, at 131-33. 
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reflected in the language of the Labour Standards Law.124 This reflects the 
extent to which the “reasonableness” test has come to permeate judicial 
thinking in respect of all discrimination, both public and private. 
The Sumitomo Cement case, and the others in this line of cases that 
advanced the rights of women in the 1960s and 1970s, may of course 
suggest that the courts may not be so hostile to enforcing the right to 
equality, and that they could in any event enforce the right if they were so 
inclined. On the first point, the lessons of the women’s rights cases are 
somewhat more complicated. The extent to which the courts went well 
beyond both the statutory language and the contractual intent of the parties 
in protecting the rights of women in the first phase of women’s rights 
litigation in the 1960s and 1970s, does not mean that the courts will be 
inclined to protect women, or indeed any other groups, from other forms of 
discrimination. An excellent analysis of the employment-related litigation 
for that period has proposed a more over-arching theory that places the 
Sumitomo Cement line of cases in perspective.125 According to this theory, 
the courts were engaged in creating a coherent and internally consistent 
legal framework for the employment relationship in Japan, and one 
fundamental plank of that framework was job security in a life-time 
employment system. Thus, not only women were receiving the protection 
of the courts, but employees generally were protected from termination of 
all sorts. Thus, the early women’s rights cases, in which the primary issues 
were related to job security, can be seen as falling within this grander 
judicial project, having much more to do with shaping the employment 
relationship than with equality rights per se. The quid pro quo in this 
judicially created scheme, however, was that companies would be given 
very wide discretion in terms of how they hired and managed their 
employees. Thus the courts deferred to corporate discretion and dismissed 
discrimination claims for damages where the issues involved hiring, 
transfers, promotions, farming out employees to sister companies, and the 
like.126 
The fact remains that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, 
have done little to protect minorities more generally from discrimination. 
The outlook for the ability of foreigners, and minorities among the foreign 
population in Japan, to find protection from discrimination under the 
“unreasonable discrimination” test is particularly bleak. Japanese 
 
 124. Tokyo Metro Gov’t case, Sup. Ct., majority opinion, sections 4(2), (3) 
 125. Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service 
of – Stability?, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 635 (1996). 
 126. Id. 
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constitutional scholars observe that, under this test, the courts have always 
found it remarkably easy to classify discriminatory treatment of foreigners 
as reasonable.127 That is of course illustrated in the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government case. Another recent example is a case in which the courts 
upheld the government’s denial of pension and disability benefits to 
Taiwanese-Japanese who served with the Imperial Japanese Army, on the 
grounds that they were now foreigners. In the Supreme Court decision on 
this issue, the Court held that the discriminatory treatment was reasonable, 
based as it was on nationality, even though the claimants (or their family 
members, on whose behalf they raised their claims) had been Japanese 
nationals when they served in the Japanese military, and had been stripped 
of their Japanese nationality by the Japanese government after the 
execution of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.128 There was no analysis in 
the decision as to the fairness of the distinction, or the harm that it caused. 
Nor was there any examination of what the objective of the distinction was 
alleged to have been, or why it was either necessary or important, or 
whether it could have been achieved through some means that was less 
discriminatory.129 
The courts have similarly upheld as reasonable the denial to foreigners 
of pension benefits,130 and, more recently, of social security benefits.131 The 
denial of coverage under the Daily Life Security Law132 to foreigners who 
have neither permanent nor long-term resident status means that such 
foreigners may be refused treatment by healthcare providers. Without the 
benefit of any analysis whatsoever, this, too, was held to be reasonable 
discrimination, and to have been within the sphere of legislative discretion 
in any event.133 
 
 127. See, e.g., MATSUI, supra note 3, at 381. 
 128. Supreme Court Judgment, ( April 28, 1992), 46 Minshū 4 245 (Taiwanese Veterans’ case), at 
para 5. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Supreme Court Judgment, (November 2, 1959) (the law in question has since been 
superseded). 
 131. Tokyo High Court Judgment, (April 24, 1997) (Social Security for Foreigners case). 
 132. Law No. 144 of 1950 (as amended). 
 133. Social Security for Foreigners case, section 4(2). For an overview of the legal treatment of 
foreigners with respect to social security and healthcare benefits, see TEZUKA KAZUAKI , GAIKOKUJIN 
TO HŌ [Foreigners and the Law], 301-29 (3d ed. 2005). 
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V. SIGNIFICANCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. Why the Doctrine Matters 
As a purely descriptive matter, it can be argued that the shortcomings 
of the doctrine employed by the courts for analyzing and resolving 
discrimination cases is one significant factor contributing to the general 
failure of the system to enforce and adequately protect the right to equality. 
As discussed earlier, the test leads to confused thinking about equality 
rights and discrimination, and provides no assistance to judges grappling 
with the issue in concrete cases. To the extent that one accepts the basic 
premise that courts are constrained and guided by the analytical models and 
legal principles established in precedents, and that the conclusions that 
judges reach tend to be consistent with the application of such principles, 
then the inadequacy of the “unreasonable discrimination” test can be 
argued to be one reason for the failure of the courts to enforce the right to 
equality under the law. 
That still leaves the causality issues unsettled, and does not really 
address the normative importance of the analysis. And it will be recalled 
that the second point raised by the Sumitomo Cement case is the notion that 
the courts could enforce equality rights if they were so inclined, even using 
the “unreasonable discrimination” test. The corollary is that if they are not 
so inclined, surely the issue of doctrine is beside the point, and arguments 
for a more sophisticated approach to the judicial analysis of discrimination 
are futile. In short, it raises the question of why the doctrine matters at all, 
and why it merits any attention. As mentioned earlier, a great deal has been 
written about why the Supreme Court (in particular) has been so timid, or 
so conservative depending on one’s point of view, in exercising its judicial 
review powers. Explanations range from the lack of real judicial 
independence, deep conservatism of a fairly uniform judiciary, political 
weakness and a fear that the court’s decisions might be ignored by the 
legislature and the executive, to broader sociological and cultural 
explanations.134 One might be inclined to think that these are really the 
 
 134. See, e.g., John O. Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW IN JAPAN: AN 
ANNUAL, 1, 1-18 (1995); Haley, Judiciary, supra note 2; Malcolm M. Feeley, The Bench, the Bar, and 
the State: Judicial Independence in Japan and the United States, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 67, 79-83 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002); Setsuo 
Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN 
SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICS, (Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer & Michael K. Young 
eds., 2001); Ramseyer, Judicial Independence, supra note 2; RAMSEYER, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2; Upham, Political Lackeys, supra note 2; Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial 
Review in Japan: An Overview of Efforts to Introduce U.S. Theories, in FIVE DECADES OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 251, 251-77 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); Law, 
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more important issues, and that unless and until the courts are more 
predisposed to enforce rights generally, and the right to equality more 
specifically, the legal test itself is really not that significant. 
While these other lines of inquiry into why the courts are so reluctant 
to enforce rights are obviously of great value, I would argue that focusing 
on the test itself is nonetheless important. Why and how doctrine is 
significant to judicial outcomes in any legal system is obviously a 
complicated and involved theoretical question that cannot be explored in 
any meaningful way here—but some discussion is necessary in order to 
defend the relevance and importance of this comparative analysis of the 
doctrine.135 We can begin with the role that judges play in the Japanese 
legal system. John Haley, one of the preeminent authorities in Japanese 
law, makes the very strong argument that the judges “play a central part in 
the process of creating and enforcing legal rules.”136 He dismisses the view 
often expressed in non-Japanese scholarship that the judiciary is the least 
influential branch of government, and asserts that a more careful analysis 
of the legal system suggests that “[j]udges are the law’s primary actors.”137 
Moreover, while Haley and Ramseyer disagree over the extent to 
which the judiciary is subject to political influence, and thus lacking 
political independence as the third branch of government, they and others 
all suggest that the Japanese judges are, generally speaking, highly 
professional, honest, and genuinely serious about their judicial role. Indeed, 
Ramseyer, who is more critical of the degree of judicial independence in 
Japan, argues that there is only evidence of judges deciding cases in a 
manner likely to have been influenced by the preferences of the governing 
political party in a narrow range of politically sensitive issues, particularly 
those involving Article 9 (the war renouncing provision of the 
Constitution) and vote malapportionment. Otherwise the evidence suggests 
that they are unbiased and independent.138 
 
Conservative Court, supra note 2. In Japanese, see HIGUCHI YOICHI, KENPŌ HANREI WO YOMINAOSU 
[Re-reading Constitutional Precedents] (2d ed. 1999); ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 3. 
 135. This question, of course, transcends the issue of the Japanese judiciary and the Japanese legal 
system, and implicates much broader and more profound debates over the legitimacy of judicial 
decision making, and the extent to which judges are genuinely interpreting and implementing law, as 
opposed to imposing personal policy preferences, in an exercise of political power, under the veneer of 
legal language. 
 136. HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 2, at xviii. 
 137. Id. at 90. 
 138. RAMSEYER, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2, at 71-72, 80-81, 94-95, 121. 
See also Upham, Political Lackeys, supra note 2, at 430. Upham makes the interesting point that while 
Haley defends the integrity and independence of the judiciary, he tends to do so as an institution, and 
tends to submerge the individual judges within the tightly controlled institutional framework, while 
Ramseyer, who is more critical of the lack of judicial independence, actually portrays the judges as 
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The picture that emerges is a judiciary comprised of highly 
professional and honest judges, largely homogeneous in their conservative 
world view, and more tightly controlled by the bureaucratic court 
administration than their counterparts in most common law jurisdictions. 
Thus, while they may be somewhat less concerned about “applying the 
law” than judges in Anglo-American systems,139 they are still very much 
dedicated and genuinely interested in fulfilling their role as interpreters and 
implementers of law, and they are indeed central to the process of 
interpreting and enforcing the law. There is, therefore, room to argue that 
doctrine can develop within the Japanese judicial system, spreading in 
influence over time as more individual judges are persuaded by the 
arguments commending a particular approach, more lawyers advance legal 
arguments in their cases grounded upon the new doctrine, more scholars 
develop criticisms of judicial decisions that fail to employ the new 
doctrine, and finally, more judges who feel increasingly vulnerable to 
criticism for relying on the old “unreasonable discrimination” test, in turn 
employ the new doctrine. 
Even at a less ambitious or optimistic level, it could be suggested that 
if a more rigorous and sophisticated analysis of equality rights issues works 
its way into the jurisprudence, even those conservative judges who are 
most predisposed to dismiss discrimination claims will arguably be forced 
to give reasons that to some extent address the rights-based analytical 
model. As such, it will become more difficult to short-circuit questions 
regarding the unfairness of the distinction at issue and the harm it caused, 
or how it can be justified in accordance with the values of a democratic 
society. In short, the “unreasonable discrimination” test may become 
increasingly inadequate, even for those judges predisposed to dismiss 
discrimination claims, as it is incapable of responding in a sophisticated 
and convincing manner to the approach of a rights-based model; and judges 
may become increasingly uncomfortable with the exposure created by 
employing what is a simplistic test by comparison. This argument is in line 
with the fundamental reason that judges, particularly in common law 
systems, are required to provide detailed written reasons for their 
judgments. 
There are several features of the Japanese system that make this 
argument for the relevance of doctrine more credible. The status of 
precedent is one. On the one hand, precedent is seen as highly authoritative, 
 
individual decision makers who, apart from the cases involving the identified politically sensitive 
issues, approach their role as autonomous and rational decision makers. Upham, Political Lackeys, 
supra note 2, at 450-51. 
 139. Upham, Political Lackeys, supra note 2, at 453. 
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and courts tend to follow judicial precedents of higher courts, and are 
influenced by the decisions of other courts at their level. Thus, doctrine 
tends to be followed.140 On the other hand, it is not binding according to a 
formal principle of stare decisis as it is in common law systems, so there is 
room for lower courts to depart from higher court precedent in being 
somewhat more innovative in introducing new approaches.141 Also, the 
influence of scholars in the development of law generally, and on the 
shaping of doctrine in particular, is stronger in Japan than it is in many 
common law countries—though even in the common law world there is 
powerful evidence that scholarly work exerts an influence on the 
development of jurisprudence. And while it can be argued in response that 
the widespread scholarly criticism of judicial conservatism in Japan has not 
had any marked effect in liberalizing the Supreme Court in particular, there 
are a number of examples of scholarly projects actually resulting in the 
development of new approaches and the adoption of new principles by the 
Japanese courts. For instance, the work of Eiichi Makino, professor of law 
at Tokyo University, was the primary influence in the introduction of the 
principles of “abuse of rights” and good faith into Japanese law.142 
A final reason that the focus on doctrine has some relevance to 
normative arguments for improving the protection of certain rights in the 
Japanese legal system is that it is within the power of the courts to change. 
While the broader explanations for judicial conservatism and passivity are 
important in trying to understand why the courts are so conservative or 
timid when it comes to rights enforcement, as a basis for pragmatic 
normative arguments they become less attractive as the basis for attempting 
to mobilize change. They lead to arguments for solutions that are deeply 
structural and political, and beyond the ability of the judicial system itself 
to remedy. In contrast, the normative argument for the adoption of a legal 
 
 140. See HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 2, at 2. 
 141. An example of this can be found in the Naganuma case, involving the constitutionality of the 
Self-Defense Forces, where the Sapporo District Court explicitly rejected the political question doctrine 
that had been developed by the Supreme Court in the Sunakawa case. Sapporo District Court Judgment 
Judgment (Sept. 7, 1973) 712 Hanrei Jihō 24 (Naganuma case), translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 
12, at 83; Supreme Court Judgment, Grand Bench, (December 16, 1959), (Sunakawa case), court 
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1959.12.16-1959-A-
No.710.html. (The Sapporo High Court, of course, went on to overturn the District Court in Naganuma, 
and the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. Translations of both can be found in BEER & 
ITOH, supra note 12). 
 142. HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 2, at 48-49; see, e.g., Foote, supra note 125, at 644 (discussing the 
abuse of right doctrine); Michio Aoyama, Wagakuni ni okeru kenri ran’yo rinen no hatten [The 
Development of the Abuse of Right Doctrine in Our Country], in SUEKAWA SENSEI KOKI KINEN – KENRI 
NO RAN’YO [In Honour of Professor Suekawa – Abuse of Rights] (1965), translated in John. O. Haley et 
al., LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 112 (1994). 
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test or analytical framework that is more consistent with the right to 
equality in the Constitution, proposes a solution that is more modest and 
realistic, and hence potentially effective, even if one accepts all the 
arguments about the judiciary being a conservative and tightly controlled 
bureaucratic institution. 
In sum, the absence of a more robust and sophisticated analytical 
approach is a factor that contributes to weak protection of the equality 
right, while from a normative perspective, features of the Japanese legal 
system and past experience suggest that there is scope for the introduction 
of, and the incremental increase in the judicial employment of, new 
doctrine. Such an emergence and spread of a more sophisticated doctrine, 
consistent with the widely accepted approach to equality rights as 
exemplified by the Canadian jurisprudence, would in turn make it more 
difficult for courts to blithely dismiss discrimination cases, and over time 
could lead to more rigorous and progressive protection of this fundamental 
constitutional right. And what is more, while much more exhaustive 
research is called for to prove the hypothesis, there is some evidence that 
this process has been unfolding over the last several years, beginning with 
powerful dissents in a number of Supreme Court decisions, and continuing 
with the majority opinion in the Nationality Act case of last year. It is to 
these that we now turn. 
B. Emergence of a New Doctrine 
Returning to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case, the Tokyo 
High Court had found there to be discrimination, and in looking at the issue 
of justification it applied the principle of “less restrictive alternative” in 
inquiring into whether the objectives of the policy barring foreigners, to 
prevent foreigners being promoted to positions of public authority while 
maintaining the flexibility of the integrated personnel selection system, 
could have been achieved through means that would have been less 
discriminatory. Those arguments were picked up by the dissenting judges 
in the Supreme Court decision. 
The opinions of both Justice Takii and Justice Izumi, in contrast to the 
rest of the court, properly characterized the question before the court as 
being whether the unequal treatment of foreigners constituted 
discrimination, and if so, whether it could be justified. In the justification 
analysis, which they each purported to develop within the concept of the 
“reasonableness” test, they nonetheless looked to external and objective 
criteria as was discussed above, so that, in addition to questioning whether 
there was simply a rational connection between the means chosen and the 
objectives identified, they went on to inquire into the actual importance of 
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the purpose of excluding foreigners and the necessity of the integrated 
personnel system, and to examine whether there were less restrictive 
alternatives available to achieve the underlying objectives of the system. 
Moreover, they both made clear that the onus of proving that the 
discrimination was justified rested with the government, and they each 
examined closely the evidence the government had advanced for that 
purpose. As a final stage of his analysis, Justice Izumi examined whether 
the benefit to the system of the government’s policy outweighed the harm 
to foreign residents such as the applicant. Indeed, both justices considered 
the harm caused, particularly to special permanent residents such as the 
applicant, by the discrimination in question. In contrast, as we saw earlier, 
the majority of the Court had failed to examine in any way the nature of the 
discrimination in question or its impact on the claimant class. Both 
dissenting justices concluded that the blanket exclusion of foreigners from 
taking the exams for promotion constituted discrimination and was not 
justifiable.143 Thus, in these dissents, we see the very same elements of the 
analysis as we saw in the Canadian system, with first an examination of the 
nature of the discrimination and the magnitude of the harm that it caused, 
and then an inquiry into the question of justification, which was analyzed in 
a manner reminiscent of the Oakes test and the strict scrutiny test in the 
American system—an assessment of the importance of the legislative or 
policy objective, an examination of the rationality of the connection 
between the objective and the means, including an analysis of whether 
there were less restrictive alternatives, and finally a determination of 
whether the benefit was proportionate to the harm that the discrimination 
caused. 
There was a similarly strong dissent in an equality rights case before 
the Supreme Court ten years earlier, regarding the constitutionality of the 
Civil Code provision that limited the inheritance of illegitimate children to 
one half of that received by legitimate children, when the deceased had 
died intestate.144 The majority held that the discrimination against 
illegitimate children occasioned by the law was not “unreasonable,” in light 
of the objective of fostering respect for the legitimate children of spouses 
married by law, and thus respect for the institution of marriage itself, while 
nonetheless affording illegitimate children with some level of protection.145 
 
 143. Tokyo Metro Gov’t case, Sup. Ct., (Sup. Ct. January 26, 2005), 59 MINSHŪ 1 128, (Takii, J., 
and Izumi, J., dissenting). 
 144. Supreme Court Judgment, Grand Bench,( July 5,1995), 49 Minshū 7 1789 (Illegitimate Child 
Inheritance case). The provision of the Civil Code in question was article 900. 
 145. See id., majority opinion, sections 2 and 3. 
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Six Justices joined in two very strong dissenting opinions. Again, 
elements of what we have discussed here as being essential to an equality 
rights analysis were reflected in the dissenting justices’ reasons. The 
opinion of five of the dissenting justices inquired into the nature of the 
discrimination in relation to the dignity of the individual, emphasizing that 
the equal status of the child as an individual ought to be stressed over his or 
her status as an outsider to the marital family. Moreover, they pointed out 
that the status of the person as being illegitimate is an immutable 
characteristic, beyond the control of the person to change, but having been 
within the power of the deceased to have altered. In other words the law 
stigmatized persons who had no control over the characteristic, which was 
the basis of a distinction being made for the alleged purpose of encouraging 
respect for the institution of marriage in people other than those actually 
being affected by the law. In their view, there was thus not even a rational 
connection between the objective and the means of the provision.146 
Moreover, in addition to focusing on the nature of the discrimination 
and the harm that it caused, particularly in terms of perpetuating the social 
stigma of illegitimacy and fostering further private discrimination against 
those born out of wedlock, both dissenting opinions attempted to establish 
a standard of “higher reasonableness.” Justice Ozaki argued that such a test 
for “higher reasonableness” should require that “the level of reasonableness 
or necessity of the purpose of legislation itself on the one hand, and the 
nature, content, and extent of the rights or legal value which is to be 
restrained by discrimination on the other hand, should be fully considered, 
and whether there is a substantial link between them both should be 
determined.”147 It is difficult to resist the inference that this was influenced 
by the American framework with its different levels of scrutiny, 
particularly given that Ashibe had by then advanced his influential 
arguments that the Japanese courts should adopt the American model 
consisting of three levels of scrutiny.148 As we will examine in more detail 
below, this strand of thinking continues within Japanese scholarship, and 
 
 146. Id., dissenting opinion of Justices Nakajima, Ono, Takahashi, Ozaki, and Endo, sections 2 and 
3. 
 147. Id., dissenting opinion of Justice Ozaki, section 1 (Ozaki J. joined the dissenting opinion of 
Nakajima J., supra note 146, but also filed a separate dissenting opinion). 
 148. ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 3. Many scholars today recognize that these arguments 
were misplaced, but the preoccupation with the American model remains high, and as will be discussed 
in more detail below, many still argue for an American style multi-level scrutiny approach. As should 
be clear from the overall argument presented here, and as I will discuss in more detail below, in my 
view the American model, and particularly the three levels of scrutiny, are entirely inappropriate as an 
analytical framework for the equality rights provision of the Constitution of Japan. 
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there are those who think that the Court does indeed follow the American 
approach. 
In sum, however, there have been attempts even at the level of the 
Supreme Court to develop a test for discrimination that better incorporates 
the fundamental elements of equality rights analysis, as reflected in other 
democratic constitutional models, and to make it more consistent with the 
values of the Constitution of Japan. Until 2008, however, such attempts 
were limited to spirited dissenting opinions and lower court judgments. 
VI. ASCENDENCY OF THE NEW DOCTRINE – THE 2008 
NATIONALITY ACT CASE 
As suggested in the introduction, a recent decision of the Supreme 
Court has provided some evidence that the Court may indeed be starting to 
embrace an analytical framework that is consistent with the proportionality 
model. Or, perhaps to put it more precisely, the number of justices in the 
Supreme Court who have adopted this more rigorous approach to equality 
rights issues has finally tipped into the majority. 
A. Background to the Case 
The decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of a 
provision of the Nationality Act, handed down in June 2008, reflects what 
may be a seismic shift in the way the Court analyzes equality rights issues. 
The case has been heralded within Japan as epoch making,149 but this is 
more because of the fact that it is only the eighth case in which a law had 
been struck down by the Supreme Court, and because of the manner in 
which the Court fashioned the remedy itself.150 But when the analysis of 
the Court in this judgment is compared to the manner in which the courts 
 
 149. For extensive analysis of the case, and the resulting revisions to the Nationality Act, by 
Japanese scholars and jurists see Hasebe Yasuo, Kokusekihō ikkenhanketsu no shisōyōshiki [The Pattern 
of Thought in the Judgment Holding the Nationality Act Unconstitutional], 1366 JURIST 77 (2008); 
Sano Hiroshi, Kokusekihō ikkenhanketsu to kokusekihō no kadai [The Nationality Act Problem and the 
Judgment Holding the Nationality Act Unconstitutional], 1366 JURIST 85 (2008); Takahashi Kazuyuki 
et al., Kokusekihō ikkenhanketsu wo megutte [Regarding the Judgment Holding the Nationality Act 
Unconstitutional], 1366 JURIST 44 (2008). Also of interest is the analysis of the revisions to the law in 
accordance with the decision, in Kokuseki hō no kaisei [Revision of the Nationality Act], 1374 JURIST 2 
(2009). 
 150. Rather than strike down the entire provision as being unconstitutional, and therefore of no 
force and effect, the Court chose to interpret the impugned provision as excluding the clause that caused 
the essential distinction (which will become clearer in the discussion below). In Canadian constitutional 
jurisprudence this practice of “reading down” is common, and is understood to be a device for doing the 
least violence to the legislation while nonetheless bringing it into conformity with the constitution. But 
this aspect of the case has been the most controversial in commentary in Japan, with many criticizing 
the Court for “legislating” and thus exceeding its judicial authority. 
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have traditionally applied the “unreasonable discrimination” test in 
previous cases, informed by an understanding of the theoretical foundation 
of equality rights as discussed above, the significance of this case becomes 
much more apparent. 
The case involved a claim that was at the very nexus of two other 
distinct issues that had been festering for many years, and which had each 
come before the Court before in different forms. These two issues were the 
laws for acquisition of nationality by children born to Japanese and non-
Japanese parents on the one hand, and on the other, the distinction made 
between legitimate and illegitimate children in various areas of the law, one 
example of which we have already seen above.151 The claim, advanced by a 
number of different plaintiffs, attacked the constitutionality of Article 3(1) 
of the Nationality Act, which they argued discriminated against children 
who were born to unmarried parents of whom the father was Japanese and 
the mother non-Japanese, in the conferral of the benefit of Japanese 
nationality. 
To put the case in some context, at the time the decision was handed 
down it was estimated that there were tens of thousands of children in 
Japan who were in the same circumstances as the plaintiffs. That is, they 
had been born “out of wedlock” to non-Japanese mothers and Japanese 
fathers, and were thus unable to acquire Japanese nationality. Many were 
children of permanent residents of Japan like Masami Tapiru, the ten-year-
old girl, identified as one of plaintiffs, who spoke Japanese as a first 
language and had only rudimentary knowledge of her mother’s first 
language (Tagalog in her case).152 Yet, unable to acquire Japanese 
nationality, she is unable to travel freely, has constraints on her right to 
education, will be unable to vote even in local elections, has limited rights 
under the social security system, and, as I discussed in Part IV A, she will 
have limited access to careers in public service. 
To understand the judgment of the Court it is necessary to dwell 
briefly on the precise operation of the nationality laws. Japan is one of the 
small minority of countries that retains an almost purely jus sanguinis 
 
 151. Illegitimate Child Inheritance case, supra note 144. In the second case, the Supreme Court in 
1995 reversed a Tokyo High Court decision that had denied citizenship to a young boy who had been 
born in Japan to a mother who had abandoned the child and whose nationality was unknown (but 
suspected to be Filipino), and a father of unknown nationality (but suspected to be Japanese), deciding 
that he was entitled to Japanese nationality under Article 2(3) of the Nationality Act: Supreme Court 
Judgment, (January 27, 1995), 49 Minshu 1 56. 
 152. See Jun Hongo, Bar to Kids’ Citizenship Ruled Illegal, JAPAN TIMES, June 5, 2008; Mariko 
Yasumoto, Japanese-Filipino Kids Await Fate, JAPAN TIMES, June 4, 2008. 
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system, or bloodline basis for the acquisition of nationality at birth.153 Thus, 
Article 2(1) of the Nationality Act provides that a child shall be a Japanese 
citizen where the father or mother is a Japanese citizen at the time of birth. 
But, the concept of “father” and “mother” as used here constitutes more 
than a factual or biological relationship, but rather denotes a legal 
relationship between parent and child, and that legal relationship is required 
in order to ground a claim for nationality. For the purposes of the law, a 
legal relationship is established ipso facto when the child is born to parents 
who are married (or were married at the time of birth in the event of death 
of the father prior to birth, see Article 2(2)).154 The legal relationship may 
also be established, however, by explicit recognition by the parent in 
question—and since the mother is deemed to have recognized the child at 
birth, this is really an issue that only applies to the relationship between 
child and father in circumstances where the parents are not married. 
Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act, the article in issue in the case here, 
deals with the legal relationship in the event that the child is born to 
unmarried parents. It provides that such a child may, before reaching the 
age of 20, acquire Japanese citizenship by providing notice to the ministry, 
if he or she has obtained the “status of a legitimate child according to the 
marriage of his or her parents,” and the parent who is currently Japanese 
(or was so at death), and who was Japanese at the time of birth, recognizes 
that he or she is their child.155 In short, an illegitimate child may acquire 
nationality if his or her parents marry prior to her reaching the age of 20, 
and the Japanese parent acknowledges parenthood. What is not obvious, 
but arises from the relationship between Article 2(1) and Article 3(1), is 
that only an illegitimate child whose Japanese parent (i.e., a Japanese 
father) has not recognized him or her prior to birth is in this situation. For 
Article 2(1) provides that a person shall be a Japanese national if at the 
time of birth his or her father or mother was a Japanese national—and even 
 
 153. Nationality Act, Law No. 147 of 1950, as amended by Law No. 45 of 1984, art. 2(1). See 
generally Hosokawa Kiyoshi, Japanese Nationality in International Perspective, in NATIONALITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 177 (Ko Swan Sik, ed., 1990), and Ryoichi Yamada, et 
al, The Acquisition of Japanese Nationality Jure Sanguinis and the Constitution, 24-26 JAPAN. ANN. 
INT’L LAW 12 (1981-83). 
 154. Hosokawa, supra note 153, at 192. 
 155. The article in full provides: 
Article 3 (Acquisition of Nationality by Legitimization) 1. A person under 20 years of age 
who has acquired a status of a legitimate child according to the marriage of his or her parents 
and their recognition (excluding those who were Japanese nationals) may acquire Japanese 
nationality by filing a report with the Minister of Justice, if the father or the mother who 
recognized the child was a Japanese national at the time of the birth of the child and if the 
father or the mother is a Japanese national at present or was a Japanese national at the time of 
his her death. 
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if they are not married, acknowledgment established the legal relationship 
of “father” and “mother.” 
All of this is, quite obviously, rather confusing. But the bottom line is 
that by combination of these two provisions, it is effectively illegitimate 
children who are born to a non-Japanese mother and a Japanese father who 
has not acknowledged paternity prior to birth, who are burdened with the 
limitation in Article 3(1). That restriction limits them to acquiring 
nationality only in the event that their parents subsequently marry (thereby 
“legitimating” their birth), and the Japanese father acknowledges 
parenthood. 
In essence, then, the regime so created makes a number of cross-
cutting distinctions: between illegitimate and legitimate children; between 
children who are born to Japanese mothers and non-Japanese fathers on the 
one hand, and non-Japanese mothers and Japanese fathers on the other 
hand; and finally, between those illegitimate children born of a non-
Japanese mother and a Japanese father, but who were acknowledged by the 
father before birth on the one hand, and children in precisely the same 
circumstances but who were not acknowledged by the father before birth. It 
was this last distinction that was central to the decision, for the children in 
the second category had to be “legitimated” by the subsequent marriage of 
their parents in order to gain nationality, while those in the first category 
did not. This last and rather bizarre distinction is illustrated most strikingly 
by one of the plaintiffs—Masami Tapriu, the ten-year-old daughter of a 
Filipino mother and Japanese father, has a six-year-old sister, Naomi Sato, 
who is Japanese by operation of Article 2(1), since her father 
acknowledged paternity prior to her birth.156 
B. The Majority’s Application of the New Doctrine 
The majority opinion of the Court was only joined in by Chief Justice 
Shimada and two other justices, though it was largely supported on the 
central issue of the finding of unconstitutionality in the separate concurring 
opinions of seven other justices. There were differing views among this 
overall majority on the remedy to be fashioned. The majority decision 
began by examining the operation of Article 3(1) and Article 2(1) of the 
Nationality Act, as discussed above in Part V A, concluding that 
“consequently, Article 3, para. 1 of said Act is practically applied only to a 
child who was born to a couple of a Japanese father and a non-Japanese 
mother having no legal marital relationship and who was not acknowledged 
 
 156. Mariko Yasumoto, Japanese-Filipino Kids Await Fate, JAPAN TIMES, June 4, 2008. 
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by the father before birth.”157 The Court then noted that the plaintiffs had 
alleged that the distinction this caused, in violation of the right to equality 
in Article 14 of the Constitution, as explained above, was between 
illegitimate children who are born of mixed-nationality parentage but 
whose Japanese father recognized paternity prior to birth, and such children 
whose Japanese father recognizes paternity after birth, and who 
consequently are only able to gain Japanese nationality by having their 
parents marry in order to “legitimate” their status. 
The Court repeated that only unreasonable discrimination is 
understood to be prohibited by the Constitution, but went on to explain that 
this means the discrimination must have reasonable grounds, and that: 
Where a reasonable basis cannot be found in the legislative purpose of 
making such a distinction even if the discretionary power vested in the 
legislative body is taken into consideration, or where a reasonable 
relevance cannot be found between the distinction in question and the 
aforementioned legislative purpose, the distinction is deemed to 
constitute discrimination without reasonable grounds and to violate the 
provision of Article 14, para. 1 of the Constitution.158 
It is worth noting the important difference that is already revealed in 
this analysis as compared to that in earlier cases. The Court did not simply 
focus on the “rational connection,” or as articulated here, the relevance 
between the legislative means and the purpose of the law, but has suggested 
that in addition and prior to that question, the reasonableness of the purpose 
itself must be considered. This, I would argue, is both new and vitally 
important, as it both forces the government to justify the importance of its 
policy choice, and it provides the necessary basis for considering the 
proportionality between the benefit derived by achieving the purpose so 
identified, and the harm it is causing by violation of the right. The court did 
not go further and articulate the criteria that should be applied in assessing 
the reasonableness of the purpose, such as consistency with the values of a 
free and democratic society for instance, but nonetheless, this step is of 
major significance. For the first time in a majority decision of the Supreme 
Court, the analysis was not primarily restricted to the internal relationship 
of the objective and the means to achieve it, but the entire legislative 
scheme was also to be judged against external criteria, and, as we will see 
below, weighed against the harm it causes. 
The Court then proceeded to examine the purpose of the provision, 
noting that it was introduced into the Nationality Act in 1984 to supplement 
 
 157. Nationality Act case, (Sup. Ct., June 4, 2008), 62 MINSHŪ 6 1367, majority opinion, section 2. 
 158. Id., majority opinion, section 4(1). 
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“the basic principle of said Act, jus sanguinis, by achieving a balance (in 
treatment) with a child born in wedlock to a Japanese father and a non-
Japanese mother who may acquire Japanese nationality by birth.”159 
Further, it inferred that the purpose of the distinction, and requirement of 
“legitimization” for children born to unmarried parents of mixed-
nationality, was that “when the child has acquired the status of a child born 
in wedlock as a result of the marriage of the parents, the child’s life is 
united with the life of the Japanese father and the child obtains a close tie 
with Japanese society through his/her family life, and therefore it is 
appropriate to grant Japanese nationality to such a child.”160 The Court 
accepted the argument that where a child is born to a Japanese citizen but 
does not acquire Japanese nationality at birth (that is, because the father 
fails to acknowledge paternity before birth if the parents are not married), 
then he or she is likely to develop closer bonds with the foreign state of his 
or her mother’s nationality. The Court further recognized that Article 3(1) 
of the Nationality Act essentially creates conditions that are mere “indexes” 
or indicia of the closeness of the bond between the child and Japan, and 
that the legitimization requirement was designed to increase the strength of 
this bond. The Court held that this purpose of ensuring a sufficiently close 
connection to Japan as a prerequisite for granting nationality was legitimate 
and reasonable when the law was passed in 1984, and it noted that several 
other countries had at the time similar acknowledgement and legitimization 
provisions in their nationality laws (though the Court failed to specify 
which countries).161 
Whether the purpose was ever sufficiently important remains 
debatable, and I would differ with the Court’s conclusion on this issue. 
What the Court does not mention is that the Nationality Act was amended 
in 1984 in order to make it possible for Japan to ratify the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), which had entered into force in 1981. The Convention 
provided that all state parties were required to “grant women equal rights 
with men with respect to the nationality of their children,”162 and the 1950 
Nationality Act had been based on the principle of jus sanguinis a patre, or 
the bloodline of the father, which traced its way back to the original Civil 
Code. Under this law, only the legitimate child of a Japanese man, or the 
illegitimate child of a Japanese woman and a foreign man could acquire 
 
 159. Id. section 4(2)(a). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. sections 4(2)(a) and (b). 
 162. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 9(2), Jan. 
22, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). 
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Japanese nationality at birth; the legitimate child of a Japanese woman and 
foreign man and the illegitimate child of a Japanese man and a foreign 
woman could not acquire Japanese nationality at birth.163 The 1950 
Nationality Act had been thus enacted, based on the old Civil Code 
provisions, despite loud arguments that it was inconsistent with both 
Article 14 and Article 25 of the new Constitution. 
The 1984 amendments were designed to bring this regime into 
accordance with CEDAW. But as the Court would allude to later in the 
judgment, even the gender imbalance was not truly resolved in the new 
regime—for it will be noted that in contrast to the automatic nature of 
“recognition,” thus establishing the legal character of the relationship 
between mother and child, the scheme requires the legal relationship 
between father and child of an unmarried relationship to be established by 
the overt act of acknowledgment. The result is that the children of Japanese 
mothers may always acquire Japanese nationality, while illegitimate 
children of a Japanese father also need him to act, and if he acts after the 
birth of the child, he must also marry the mother to confer nationality upon 
his child. It is not at all clear that either the act of acknowledgment or 
requirement to marry were ever valid mechanisms to ensure a close bond 
between the child and Japan, or were effective proxies to reflect such a 
bond, if indeed a close bond was ever really the purpose. The whole point 
of jus sanguinis is that the only bond one requires with the “nation” is a 
genetic one. Under Article 2 of the Nationality Act a person could be born 
in Russia to Japanese parents and never live in Japan, and yet still be 
Japanese by birth. Conversely, Korean-Japanese (zainichi kankokujin) who 
are born in Japan to third-generation Korean-Japanese parents, who know 
no other culture and speak no other language but Japanese, cannot acquire 
Japanese nationality as of right. The legal scheme is simply not about close 
bonds to the state, but is all about race and ethnicity. 
In any event, all of that is merely context. Whether one agrees with the 
Court’s initial finding that the purpose of the legislation was valid and 
reasonable at the time that it was passed, the important points are that first, 
it analyzed that purpose to determine its validity, and second, the Court 
then went on to further analyze whether that purpose continued to be valid 
and reasonable today. We return to that second step now. 
The Court, having established that the fundamental purpose of the 
legislation was to ensure that there was a sufficiently close connection 
between the child and the Japanese parent, and thus a close connection 
between the child and the nation, it went on to look at the relevance of the 
 
 163. Hosokawa, supra note 153, at 183. 
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means employed by the legislation to achieve this objective. This is 
essentially the rational connection analysis that we examined earlier. The 
Court held that there may have been, at the time the amendment was 
enacted, “adequate reasons to consider that . . . the fact of the legal 
marriage of the parents would show the existence of the child’s close tie 
with Japan developed through his/her family life with the Japanese father,” 
and so “. . . a certain reasonable relevance can be found between the 
provision that requires legitimation in addition to acknowledgment for 
granting Japanese nationality, and the legislative purpose mentioned 
above.”164 But the Court then proceeded to examine whether that could still 
be said to be true at the time the plaintiffs commenced their claims. 
The Court held that the social realities of family life, including the 
increases in mixed-nationality relationships and the number of children 
resulting from such relationships, and the more diverse views on marriage 
and the ideal structure of parent-child relationships, undermined the 
validity of marriage as a proxy for the bond between a child and the state. 
The Court concluded that “it is impossible to measure the degree of 
closeness of the tie between children and Japan just by examining whether 
or not their parents are legally married.”165 In further support of its 
conclusion that, in the current circumstances, there was not a sufficient 
rational connection between the objective and means, the Court noted that 
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which Japan 
has ratified, prohibit discrimination against children “because of birth” (or, 
to be more precise, on the basis of legitimacy). This reference to 
international law principles, and Japan’s international treaty obligations, is 
in and of itself a very positive development, and it again also illustrates the 
Court looking to criteria external to the four corners of the legislation in 
assessing not only validity of purpose, but the nature of the rational 
connection between the means and that purpose. 
The Court next went back to the nature of the distinction itself, and 
examined the nature of the harm that it caused to those discriminated 
against. In terms of the theoretical approaches we reviewed earlier, and my 
criticism of earlier decisions of the Court, this is profoundly important. To 
be sure, the Court was not proceeding in the same methodical order as the 
Oakes test, that is, looking first at the nature of the discrimination and the 
harm caused thereby as part of assessing whether there has been a violation 
of the right, and only then proceeding to analyze justification questions 
 
 164. Nationality Act case, majority opinion, section 4(2)(b). 
 165. Id. section 4(2)(c). 
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involving the importance of the legislative purpose, rational connection, 
and proportionality. However, it covered the same ground, and in particular 
the Court did analyze the nature of the distinction, and assessed the gravity 
of the harm it would cause. In terms of the more general proportionality 
test discussed earlier, this constituted an evaluation of the effects, in 
addition to the objective and means, and as such was a dramatic departure 
from the form of analysis in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case. 
The Court began this evaluation of the effects of the discrimination by 
examining again the nature of the distinction made by the operation of the 
two provisions of the legislation: 
As a result, not only a child born in wedlock to a Japanese father or 
mother but also a child born out of wedlock and acknowledged by a 
Japanese father before birth and a child born out of wedlock to a 
Japanese mother are to acquire Japanese nationality by birth, whereas 
only a child born out of wedlock who is acknowledged by a Japanese 
father but has not acquired the status of a child born in wedlock as a 
result of legitimation, although such a child is also born to a Japanese 
citizen as his/her parent by blood and has a legal parent-child 
relationship with a Japanese citizen, is unable to acquire Japanese 
nationality by birth or even by making a notification under Article 3, 
para. 1 of said Act. We should say that due to such distinction, a child 
born out of wedlock who satisfies only the requirement of being 
acknowledged by a Japanese father after birth, alone, is subject to 
considerable discriminatory treatment in acquiring Japanese 
nationality.166 
The Court then proceeded to discuss the nature of the injury to those 
children who were denied nationality on the basis of this discriminatory 
treatment, stating that the acquisition of nationality “means a lot to people 
in order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamental human rights and other 
benefits in Japan,” and that as a result, “the disadvantages that children 
would suffer from the above-mentioned discriminatory treatment cannot be 
overlooked, and we must say that we can hardly find reasonable relevance 
between such discriminatory treatment and the aforementioned legislative 
purpose.”167 In again using the word “relevance” the Court rather 
unfortunately seems to have confused rational connection with 
proportionality, but it seems fairly clear here that the Court is looking at the 
balance between the putative purpose of the legislation, and the degree of 
harm caused to those who suffer the effect of the discrimination. 
 
 166. Id. section 4(2)(d). 
 167. Id. 
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The Court went on to point out that, if the purpose was to limit 
Japanese nationality to persons with a close tie to Japan, the provision 
“applies a means that goes far beyond the bounds where reasonable 
relevance with such legislative purpose can be found.”168 Indeed, the Court 
argued, though not specifically in these terms, that the provision was overly 
inclusive (or more precisely, over exclusive, since it excluded even such 
children as the plaintiffs, who were born and raised in Japan and quite 
obviously did have close ties to the country), that it was not the least 
restrictive means of achieving the objective (since other less discriminatory 
and more precise proxies and measures of close ties could be fashioned), 
and that moreover, it was particularly pernicious because it essentially 
punished children for a failure on the part of their parents to get married, 
over which the children had no control.169 As such, the Court was 
employing all the aspects of the analytical framework that was discussed 
and championed above in our review of the Canadian example, and which 
the Court quite conspicuously ignored in the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government case. 
The Court thus concluded that Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act, and 
the distinction that it made, while having a reasonable purpose, had lost its 
rational connection (or relevance, in the language of the court) to that 
purpose, and that the discrimination that it created was unreasonable and a 
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It then set about fashioning a 
remedy, which it did by construing Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act so as 
to “read down” the requirement of marriage and thus legitimization as a 
condition for acquiring nationality.170 As mentioned earlier, the Court’s 
decision on the nature of the remedy turned out to be one of the most 
controversial elements of the decision, and is what spawned so many 
concurring but somewhat distinguishable decisions—but that controversy, 
which focused in large part on the scope of judicial review and concern for 
“judicial legislating,” need not concern us here. 
It may be useful to consider the exact form of the distinction that was 
drawn by the Nationality Act, and thus the precise nature of the 
discrimination. Because on one level it may appear that the Court here once 
again struck down a law on the basis of a bizarre distinction, as it did in the 
Patricide case. In that case the Court seemed to be comparing the 
legislative treatment of persons accused of murdering ascendants with 
those accused of murdering anyone but ascendants, and here the narrow 
 
 168. Id. section 4(2)(e). 
 169. Id. section 4(2)(d) and (e). 
 170. Id. section 5. 
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distinction seems to be between those children of un-wed Japanese fathers 
and foreign mothers who were acknowledged prior to birth by their father, 
and children of similar relationships but who were only acknowledged after 
their birth by their father. In the Patricide case it was discrimination against 
one group of murders as compared to another, and in this case it is the 
discrimination against one small set of illegitimate children of foreign 
mothers as compared to another group of similarly illegitimate children of 
foreign mothers. Where, one might reasonably ask, is the discrimination 
based on an immutable characteristic that goes to the identity of the 
individual in a manner that is injurious to dignity? 
Once again, the Court did not do the best job of analyzing the 
distinction and explaining the nature of the discrimination—though, in my 
view, it did not totally misconstrue the nature of the discrimination in the 
way the Court did in the Patricide case. The discrimination in question here 
affects a subset of a group of children that is defined on the basis of foreign 
parenthood and illegitimacy, and it discriminates against that subgroup on 
the basis of its illegitimacy. The title of the provision in the Act is 
“legitimation,” and the entire thrust of the provision is to make acquisition 
of a fundamental benefit, indeed the status necessary to access other 
fundamental human rights, conditional upon transforming their illegitimate 
status to legitimate. As such, the legislative scheme is discriminating 
against people on the basis of the social status of legitimacy, something the 
person has no personal control over and cannot change, in a manner that 
signals to society that those who lack this status of legitimacy are less 
worthy of the respect and concern of the state and society at large. 
There is also the less obvious gender discrimination, which the Court 
did make passing reference to, and which Justice Izumi makes more 
explicit in his concurring opinion.171 As mentioned earlier, the children of 
Japanese mothers are automatically granted nationality, whereas the 
illegitimate children of Japanese men only receive Japanese nationality 
automatically at birth if the father has already by that time acknowledged 
the child as his own—thereafter, he not only has to acknowledge the child, 
he must also marry the mother in order to have his child obtain Japanese 
nationality as of right (that is, without having to apply for naturalization, 
which is granted at the discretion of the Minister). This is not consistent 
with the provision in CEDAW, and it reflects discrimination on the basis of 
gender. It may be argued that all men have to do in such circumstances is 
recognize the child as theirs prior to birth—but herein lies an essential 
element in the analysis of both aspects of the discrimination. As a factual 
 
 171. Id. concurring opinion of Justice Tokuji, section 1. 
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matter it is far easier to ascertain paternity after birth than before birth. Yet 
it is precisely when, as a practical matter, it is easier to determine paternity, 
that the law makes it more difficult to acquire nationality. 
This fact is highly relevant to the nature of the discrimination based on 
legitimacy. For in a large number of cases, including all of the plaintiffs in 
the lawsuit, the “recognition” by the father was compelled by legal 
proceedings.172 In other words, illegitimate children seeking to acquire the 
various rights and support that flow from the legal relationship with a 
“father” that is created by “recognition,” have to compel such 
acknowledgment, which practically speaking, is only possible after birth. 
Therefore, as a factual matter, the vast majority of illegitimate children of 
Japanese men and foreign women will be in the subset of illegitimate 
children against whom the law discriminates. And while they can compel 
recognition, they cannot compel their parents to marry. 
The majority opinion of the Court suggests that the majority clearly 
understood the essence of the discrimination. Thus, while they highlighted 
the odd distinction drawn between illegitimate children recognized by 
fathers prior to birth and illegitimate children not recognized until after 
birth, they did so primarily to highlight the lack of rational connection 
between the purpose of the legislation and the means thus employed.173 
While the court did not address the manner in which this discrimination 
could add to the already significant stigma and indeed legal disadvantage 
that illegitimate children bear in Japanese society, and did not do as much 
as one would have liked to see in terms of evaluating the injury this causes 
to such people, it seems clear that the Court was focused on the 
discrimination based on the social status of legitimacy. The reference to the 
ICCPR and CRC prohibitions against discrimination based on illegitimacy, 
and to the fact that many other countries are “scrapping discriminatory 
treatment by law against children born out of wedlock”174 make this clear. 
And indeed the remedy fashioned by the majority further reflects its true 
concern. The Court essentially “read down” the clause of the provision that 
reads “who has acquired a status of a legitimate child according to the 
marriage of his or her parents.”175 This left in place the distinction between 
 
 172. Yasumoto, supra note 152. 
 173. Nationality Act case, (Sup. Ct., June 4, 2008), 62 MINSHŪ 6 1367, majority opinion, section 
4(2)(e). 
 174. Id. section 4(2)(c). 
 175. It should be noted that the translation of the provision in the Supreme Court provisional 
translation of the judgment differs from the official translation of the Nationality Act. In my discussion 
of the wording of the provision, I am relying on the official translation of the Act, which is the better 
translation. 
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children acknowledged before birth, who acquired nationality 
automatically, and those recognized by their father after birth, who were 
required to make a notification to the ministry in order to acquire 
nationality as of right. But it eliminated the requirement that the latter 
group of children be “legitimated” by the marriage of their parents as a 
condition of acquiring nationality, and thus ended the discrimination based 
on the social status of illegitimacy. 
Thus, I would suggest that all the elements of the framework of the 
proportionality analysis, as exemplified in the Canadian approach 
examined above, are present in the majority’s treatment of the issue in this 
case, though with some elements not articulated or examined as clearly as 
one might like. The court examined the precise nature of the distinction 
drawn by the legislation, and discussed the character of the discrimination 
it created. In doing so it evaluated the extent and nature of the harm that the 
discrimination caused. Then, in turning to the “reasonableness” or 
justification of the discrimination, the Court did not merely assess the 
rational connection by reference to the question of whether the means 
adopted were likely to advance the fulfilment of the objective. It looked at 
the complexity of the current social reality in analyzing the sufficiency and 
reasonableness of the legislative proxy, and moreover assessed whether the 
legislative mechanism was narrowly tailored or, conversely, was overly 
inclusive and not the least restrictive alternative to achieving the objective. 
Finally, the Court engaged, if only implicitly, in an assessment of the 
proportionality between the harm caused to those who were affected by the 
discrimination, and the benefit to be derived from the legislative 
distinction. All of these steps are, as I have argued above, important in an 
analysis of claims to the right to equality, and have been ignored by the 
Japanese courts in the past. 
C. The Dissent and the Old Doctrine 
Indeed, the dissenting opinions, particularly that of Justices Yokō, 
Tsuno, and Furuta (hereinafter, the “Yokō opinion”), again illustrates the 
traditional approach to equality rights analysis by the courts. With typical 
deference to the Diet, the Yokō opinion began with the assertion that under 
the provision, “legitimated children are allowed to acquire Japanese 
nationality by making a notification whereas non-legitimated children are 
required to follow the naturalization procedure, and we believe that these 
provisions are not beyond the range of choices of legislative policy and 
therefore not in violation of Article 14, para. 1 of the Constitution.”176 
 
 176. Nationality Act case, dissenting opinion of Justices Yokō, Tsuno and Furuta, at para. 1. 
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Immediately apparent, at the outset of the analysis, is that the central 
question was identified as not being the nature of the discrimination and the 
harm it causes, or even whether it can be justified in terms that are 
consistent with the values of the Constitution, but simply whether the 
legislation and the policy choices it reflects are properly within the 
discretion of the legislature. 
Indeed, far from assessing the nature of the harm that the 
discrimination might cause, the Yokō opinion categorically denies the 
relevance of any inquiry into the consequences of the discrimination. The 
granting of nationality, the dissenting Justices argued, is one of the most 
fundamental sovereign acts of a national community, and there must 
therefore be broad legislative discretion to formulate the requirements for 
granting nationality, so long as there are uniform and clear standards for the 
acquisition of nationality at birth. Thus, so they argued, even though 
nationality is an important legal status for the enjoyment of other 
fundamental rights, it is impermissible “in principle, to claim nationality of 
a particular state as a right, and such importance of nationality cannot be 
deemed to have any influence on the aforementioned legislative 
discretion.”177 I would suggest that according to this principle a legislature 
could pass laws that, according to a clear and uniform standard, limit the 
acquisition of nationality at birth to those persons of a particular race or 
ethnicity, and still be within the legitimate scope of legislative discretion. 
That such a plainly racist policy could satisfy their test should illustrate its 
obvious inadequacy. 
On justification, the Yokō opinion quibbles with various features of 
the majority decision, but does not address the crucial questions of rational 
connection, least restrictive means, or proportionality between the benefit 
and the harm of the legislation. One of their main criticisms of the majority 
decision is regarding the argument that there have been sociological 
changes that undermine the validity of marriage as a proxy for close ties to 
Japan. But their attack focuses on the number of such illegitimate births in 
Japan, in absolute terms, as an increase over time, and relative to European 
society (and it is not at all clear that the numbers refer to all illegitimate 
births, or just illegitimate births to mixed nationality parents—and in any 
event, quite amazingly, the dissenting justices dismiss as insignificant the 
near doubling of the rate of out-of-wedlock births between 1985 and 
2003).178 They simply accepted without the slightest analysis, the 
proposition that “non-legitimated children have different levels of ties with 
 
 177. Id. section 1. 
 178. Id. section 2. 
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Japan,” and that marriage of a person’s parents is a sound proxy for 
establishing the degree to which that person has a bond with the country.179 
The justices never engaged, far less refuted, the argument of the majority 
that marriage is not a rational proxy, nor did they address whether it is 
overly inclusive, and that there might be more precise and less harmful 
ways of establishing and measuring a close bond with the country. The 
facts before the Court illustrated the very close ties that the plaintiffs had to 
the country, given that they had all been born and raised, and continued to 
live, in Japan. Finally, never having considered the nature of the 
discrimination and the potential harm that it might cause, there was 
absolutely no attempt to consider the proportionality between the proposed 
benefit and the expected injury caused by the discrimination. 
The dissenting justices in the Yokō opinion asserted with some 
considerable indignation that the remedy fashioned by the majority could 
“lead to the consequence that even a person who has been living in a 
foreign state as a foreign national over many years without having any 
relations with Japanese society can acquire Japanese nationality just by 
making a notification . . . or in other words, acquisition of Japanese 
nationality would be allowed even in cases where no close tie can be found 
between children and Japanese society.”180 But this counterfactual indeed 
reveals the fallacy of the proxy relied upon by the legislation. For under 
Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act, a child born to an unmarried Japanese 
woman and a foreign man, even someone who is born overseas and goes on 
to live his or her entire life abroad, would enjoy Japanese nationality. 
Similarly, a child born to an unmarried Japanese man and foreign woman, 
where the father acknowledges the child after birth and marries the mother, 
could obtain Japanese nationality even if he or she continued to live in a 
foreign country. Conversely, as in the case of the plaintiffs who were 
before the Court, children born in Japan and living in Japan, with 
aspirations to make their life in Japan, are denied nationality because the 
Japanese man who is their father has not married their foreign mother. The 
fact is that marriage is not a sound proxy for a bond with Japan, and upon 
closer reflection, the legislation is not only overly broad—in that it 
excludes people who would have a close bond with Japan—but it also 
entirely fails to ensure that those whom it includes have a close bond. 
 
 179. Id. section 3. 
 180. Id. section 4. 
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D. Another Possible Interpretation, and Clouds on the Horizon 
The foregoing provides some evidence that there is indeed a new 
doctrine emerging in the Supreme Court, and one that is more consistent 
with the proportionality test that forms the foundation of constitutional 
analysis in most liberal democracies today. Moreover, I have argued that, 
from a normative perspective, such a development is to be both applauded 
and encouraged. But the evidence is not at all conclusive, and there is 
indeed another viable interpretation of this recent history. What is more, 
while this article was already in final revisions for publication, the Supreme 
Court handed down yet another decision that further clouds the issues. 
The other interpretation of the recent jurisprudence, and particularly 
the Nationality Act case, is that the Supreme Court is continuing to be 
influenced by the American approach. More specifically, the Court is 
continuing to apply a minimum scrutiny or simple rational connection test 
in discrimination cases, but where the distinction drawn by the legislation 
is in respect of some other fundamental right or interest, then a more 
rigorous analysis will be applied. It will be recalled that in the American 
approach the strict scrutiny test is triggered by one of two different features 
of the discrimination in question: first, if the distinction is made by 
reference to a suspect class, such as race or (sometimes) national origin; 
and second, if the distinction burdens some other fundamental right, such 
as the right to mobility.181 It may be argued that the Court is in fact 
following the second element of this approach, and has developed a more 
rigorous level of scrutiny for those cases in which the discrimination is in 
relation to the exercise of some other fundamental right or interest. The 
extent to which the Court may also be following the American approach of 
applying a strict scrutiny test to the suspect class of race is difficult to 
discern—there are virtually no race-based discrimination cases that have 
made it to the Supreme Court, and little race-based litigation in Japan 
generally.182 
As discussed above, the majority opinion in the Nationality Act case 
did in fact focus on the importance of the status of nationality, and the 
extent to which the enjoyment of other important human rights were 
 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 77 and 78. 
 182. But see, e.g., Eric Johnston, Plaintiff Gets Redress But Not for Racial Bias, JAPAN TIMES, 
October 19, 2006, where an action was brought against an Osaka store owner for refusing to serve a 
black customer. The plaintiff was successful in winning damages on appeal, but the Osaka High Court 
refused to do so on the basis of discrimination (this decision is not reported). There is, of course, a great 
deal of discrimination-related litigation based on ethnicity more broadly defined, by Buraku, Ainu, and 
others, though the courts tend not to deal with these as discrimination based on race (or jinshu), and to 
my knowledge no case has ever been decided on the base of race alone by the Supreme Court. 
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dependent upon the acquisition of Japanese nationality. It emphasized that 
due to the operation of the impugned provision, that status was denied on 
the basis of the “personal status” of the parents, and it could not be affected 
by the efforts or will of those being discriminated against. Therefore, the 
Court went on, “it is necessary to deliberately consider whether or not there 
are any reasonable grounds for causing a distinction . . . .”183 This has been 
interpreted by many Japanese scholars as meaning that the Court was 
essentially applying a higher level of scrutiny because of the importance of 
the rights attendant to the acquisition of nationality. Indeed, Takahashi 
Kazuyuki of Meiji University, in a joint analysis of the judgment in the 
preeminent law journal Jurist, wrote that in his view there is a more 
rigorous level of scrutiny applied in those discrimination cases where an 
important legal right or status is implicated.184 Similarly, Hasebe Yasuo, a 
distinguished constitutional scholar from Tokyo University, suggested in 
his analysis of the case that the normal standard of review, involving an 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the legislation and the rationality 
between its objective and means, is a relaxed test, but that where the 
discrimination is in respect of an extremely important status from which 
legal rights flow, then a more rigorous level of review will be applied.185 
There is no explicit reference in the judgment to a heightened level of 
scrutiny, or any suggestion that there is a differentiated approach to 
discrimination cases. Takahashi concedes in his comments that it is not 
clear that the Court is indeed adopting such an approach.186 Importance is 
placed by the commentators on the phrase “deliberately consider,” as 
somehow signaling the application of a heightened level of scrutiny. It is 
quite possible that scholars are imposing upon the case an interpretation 
that is shaped by their own understanding of the American approach, which 
was championed by Ashibe long ago.187 But in September of this year a 
Petty Bench of the Supreme Court handed down yet another judgment on 
the constitutionality of the provision in the Civil Code that limits the 
inheritance of illegitimate children of an intestate deceased to one half of 
that of the legitimate offspring.188 In a 3-1 decision, the Court once again 
upheld the legitimacy of the discriminatory provision. It could be argued 
that this case supports the interpretation that the Court is applying a 
 
 183. Nationality Act case, (Sup. Ct. June 4, 2008), 62 MINSHŪ 6 1367, majority opinion, section 4. 
 184. Takahashi, Regarding the Nationality Act Case, supra note 149, at 55. 
 185. Hasebe, Pattern of Thought, supra note 149, at 77. 
 186. Takahashi, Regarding the Nationality Act Case, supra note 149, at 55-56. 
 187. ASHIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 3. 
 188. Supreme Court Judgment, Second Petty Bench, (September 30, 2009) (2009 Illegitimate Child 
Inheritance case). 
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multilayered standard of review in discrimination cases, and at first glance 
the judgment is certainly difficult to reconcile with the idea that the 
Nationality Act case represents the emergence of a new doctrine. 
Upon closer inspection, however, while the case is profoundly 
disappointing and to be criticized, it is not so clear which interpretation it 
really illustrates. The bench was comprised of only four justices, three of 
whom took part in the Nationality Act case.189 Justice Furuta, who had been 
one of the dissenting justices joining in the Yōkō dissent in the Nationality 
Act case, presided as senior justice. The plurality decision consists of only 
two paragraphs, dismissing the appeal out of hand on the basis of the 
precedent laid down in the Illegitimate Child Inheritance case we examined 
above. There is no analysis of any kind, and so no indication in it 
whatsoever as to why or how the case differed from the Nationality Act 
case. In the concurring opinion, Justice Takeuchi, the one justice who did 
not take part in the Nationality Act case, was concerned about the impact 
that invalidating the provision with retroactive effect would have on all 
inheritance settlements entered since the commencement of the case nine 
years earlier. But after recounting the extent to which Japanese and 
international society had changed in recent years, he examined the nature 
of the discrimination that the provision created, and the injury it did to the 
dignity of illegitimate offspring, and concluded that “the suspicion that the 
provision is unconstitutional is extremely strong.”190 Then, after explaining 
how legislative amendment could resolve all the problems (except, he 
seemed to forget, those of the parties before him), and noting how 
amendments to the Civil Code had been recommended to the Minister of 
Justice at the time of the previous case, he exhorted the government to 
change the law. In effect, this was an opinion that concurred in the result 
only, while roundly criticizing the impugned law as being discriminatory, 
and it gives no indication that it was based on some lower standard of 
review. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Imai, who was part of the majority in 
the Nationality Act case, however, was a robust defense of the doctrine 
established in that case. He explicitly argued that the Court should have 
followed the Nationality Act case reasoning,191 and he adopted the 
reasoning from that judgment in explaining how the impugned provision 
constituted unjustifiable discrimination against illegitimate offspring. He 
 
 189. For a detailed analysis of the short duration of judicial appointments, and the impact that has 
on conservative and timid nature of the bench, see Law, Conservative Court, supra note 2. 
 190. 2009 Illegitimate Child Inheritance case, concurring opinion of Justice Takeuchi, section 1(3). 
 191. Id., dissenting opinion of Justice Imai, section 2. 
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centered his analysis on the notion of individual dignity, bolstered by 
references to Articles 13 and 24(2) of the Constitution,192 and emphasized 
the irrationality of a legislative provision that seeks to foster respect for the 
institution of marriage by punishing people other than those who actually 
disregard the related societal norm. Moreover, as in the Nationality Act 
case, he explained how both Japanese and international society have 
changed, thus altering the legitimacy of the legislative objective itself. 
He also explained the context of the 1995 Illegitimate Child 
Inheritance case. The Supreme Court handed down its judgment in that 
case at a time when a law reform commission was examining the issue of 
the inheritance laws. The discrimination inherent in the law had been 
debated since 1979, and concrete amendments had been proposed in 1994, 
the year before the Supreme Court decided the case. Thus, he explained, 
the Supreme Court decision in that case, in which there were several very 
critical opinions that nonetheless concurred in the result, was predicated 
upon the expectation that the government was going to amend the 
impugned provision and end the era of discrimination. That, clearly, has 
not happened, and he argued that the Court had an obligation to find the 
law unconstitutional, and not abdicate its duty under cover of deferring to 
the legislature to remedy the problem.193 
In short, the result of the judgment in the 2009 Inheritance case is 
somewhat difficult to square with the idea that the Nationality Act case 
represents the emergence of a new doctrine in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
but the only reasons provided are actually more consistent with the 
framework of that doctrine. (What remains a mystery is why Justice 
Nakagawa, who was part of the majority decision in the Nationality Act 
case, silently concurred with Justice Furuta in this case). So the 2009 
Inheritance case tends to muddy the waters further, but in my view it 
neither supports the idea that the Supreme Court is following an American-
style multi-level scrutiny test, nor does it negate the proposition that the 
Court is increasingly adopting a fuller proportionality test similar to that 
which was examined above in Part II B. The reality is that it is too soon to 
tell. It is not possible to make more than a cautious claim that there is some 
meaningful evidence that this new analytical framework, one that can be 
traced back to earlier dissents in Supreme Court judgments, is in the 
process of becoming the dominant approach in the Court’s treatment of 
 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19 for discussion of Article 13. Article 24(2) of the 
Constitution provides that with regard to, among other things, inheritance, “laws shall be enacted from 
the standpoint of individual dignity . . . .” 
 193. 2009 Illegitimate Child Inheritance case, dissenting opinion of Justice Imai, sections 4 and 5. 
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discrimination cases and the enforcement of the equality rights in the 
Constitution. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that, as the number of such 
judgments grows, and if they increasingly refine and clarify the analytical 
framework and establish an increasingly rigorous logic for the test to be 
applied to discrimination issues, the “unreasonable discrimination” test has 
to come under ever increasing pressure. That pressure will operate at the 
level of the individual judges, who at the lower levels are less conservative 
and perhaps more concerned about the legal legitimacy of their judgments. 
Now they have a precedent of the Supreme Court, providing a rigorous 
proportionality test, to deal with. And over time, the pressure and influence 
exercised by this case and subsequent applications of the test may begin to 
have some traction with the Secretariat of the Supreme Court, which all 
agree is the single greatest institutional influence over the thinking and 
conduct of the judiciary.194 For the continued use of the “unreasonable 
discrimination” test in the face of increased equality rights litigation, which 
may be expected as Japan grapples with the consequences of its 
demographic changes, may start to run counter to government policy. It 
could also give rise to mounting social and institutional costs, issues to 
which the Secretariat may well be sensitive. 
Finally, from a normative perspective, everything should be done to 
encourage this development of an analytical framework that is consistent 
with the proportionality analysis that is at the foundation of the 
constitutional rule of law in most constitutional democracies in the world 
today.195 In particular, the legal scholars of Japan ought to take up this 
issue, and engage in a more wide-ranging comparative analysis of the 
court’s jurisprudence. The focus on the American approach, and 
suggestions that the court should indeed follow the American example, is 
in my view entirely misplaced. As discussed above, the American approach 
represents the requirement to develop parameters and limitations on what is 
a vague and apparently absolute constitutional provision. The multiple 
levels of review are completely unnecessary and counterproductive in the 
context of the more detailed constitutional provisions of Japan, Canada, or 
South Africa, to name just a few. What is more, as this review has 
hopefully illustrated, only the strict scrutiny test in the American approach 
conforms to the proportionality test that is considered key to the full 
 
 194. Ramsayer and Haley, for example, while they disagree fundamentally on the political 
independence of the judiciary, agree that individual judges are heavily influenced by the administrative 
control of the Secretariat. See generally RAMSAYER, JUDICIAL, supra note 2; HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 
2; Upham, Lackeys, supra note 2. 
 195. BEATTY, supra note 39. 
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protection and enjoyment of the right to be treated as an equal, and yet 
under the American approach the conditions for application of strict 
scrutiny are far too narrow. If one accepts that the right is substantive, 
rather than merely procedural, as the Japanese provision clearly reflects, 
then there is no principled reason why race should be privileged over 
gender, sexual orientation, creed, religion, or any of the other prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. Similarly, treating discrimination in respect of 
another right or interest differently than discrimination based on an 
immutable characteristic that nonetheless causes harm, is not consistent 
with a substantive notion of the right. 
Rather than encouraging the court to follow an American approach 
that is increasingly out of step with the rest of the democratic world, or 
trying ever so hard to discern evidence in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
that it is indeed applying aspects of the American doctrine, Japanese 
scholars would do well to engage in a more robust comparative analysis of 
other constitutional approaches. Through such scholarship a change in 
doctrine along the lines of the proportionality test embraced in so many 
other democracies could be further encouraged, and the equality rights 
enshrined in the Japanese constitution may finally come to be enforced in a 
meaningful way. 
CONCLUSION – SOME COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
There are few rights that are so fundamental to the foundations of 
liberal democracy and notions of liberty, and indeed to the dignity of the 
person as that concept is understood in Kantian philosophy, than that of 
equality. The right has been enshrined and provided protection in powerful 
terms in the Japanese Constitution, but the Supreme Court of Japan has, 
until last year, for the most part failed to enforce and protect the right. 
While the courts of Japan have failed to enforce the provisions of the 
Constitution more generally,196 this Article has argued that the failure of the 
 
 196. Critics will argue that indeed, of the less than ten cases in which the Supreme Court has struck 
down laws as unconstitutional, Article 14 was the basis for a disproportionate number of them—but in 
only two did the Court actually strike down a law or part of a law as being invalid for violation of 
Article 14—the Patricide case and Nationality Act case, analyzed supra in Part III A and Part V, 
respectively. There have been a couple of voter discrepancy cases, in which the disparity in the value of 
votes between urban and rural areas was alleged to be unconstitutional, beginning with a case in 1976, 
in which the Court famously held that the “situation” was unconstitutional, but declined to strike down 
the law in question, invalidate the election, or grant any remedy. See Supreme Court Judgment, (April 
14, 1976), 37 Minshū 9 1243. Freedom of expression, by way of contrast, is even less protected—not 
one law has been struck down for violation of the freedom of expression provision in the Constitution 
(see Matsui Shigenori, Freedom of Expression in Japan, 1 OSAKA UNIV. L.R. 13 (1991)). But with 
respect, as the various U.N. human rights bodies have recorded, discrimination is a serious issue in 
Japan, and none of the equality rights cases actually struck down a law that discriminated against any 
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courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to develop a rigorous analytical 
framework informed by the values of the constitutional right, and designed 
to resolve claims under the right in a principled fashion, has been a 
significant factor that has contributed to the continued failure of courts to 
enforce the right. 
As revealed through the careful analysis of a number of the key cases 
in the Japanese equality rights jurisprudence, the “unreasonable 
discrimination” test is a simplistic test that is excessively deferential to 
legislative discretion, lends itself to result oriented decision-making, and 
moreover collapses and conflates the discrete elements that are each 
essential to a more rigorous analysis of the question of whether a given law 
has unjustifiably violated the right to equality. In particular the 
“unreasonable discrimination” test causes judges to skip any examination 
of the nature of the discrimination in question, and the factual evaluation of 
the extent and nature of the harm that it has caused to the claimants. Rather, 
it leads judges to begin their entire inquiry with the justification stage of the 
analysis, and then has them focus exclusively on the question of whether 
there is a rational connection between the legislative purpose and the means 
employed in the legislative provision that gives rise to the discrimination. If 
there is a rational connection, then the discrimination is deemed reasonable, 
and that is the end of the inquiry. There is not even any meaningful inquiry 
into the validity of the legislative objective, or its consistency with the 
values of the Constitution. Such a test could, without any exaggeration, 
justify genocide. 
The seeds of a more sophisticated approach can be found as far back 
as the dissent of Justice Tanaka in the Patricide case, an approach that 
includes a number of the analytical devices employed in the increasingly 
universal proportionality analysis, as has been illustrated here by the 
Canadian example. And we have seen the evidence of those seeds 
developing further and being refined in the dissents of a number of 
important cases in the intervening years. With the Nationality Act case of 
2008, however, the majority of the Court adopted this approach to strike 
down a law that discriminated against a discrete and insular minority at the 
intersection of illegitimacy and nationality. As we have seen in detail, the 
mechanisms both for analyzing the nature of the discrimination and thus 
the question of violation, and for assessing the issue of justification, were 
exhibited in the reasoning of the majority opinion. 
 
discrete and insular minority until last year. And two cases, over sixty years and in the context of such 
well documented government discrimination, does not constitute a robust enforcement of a right. 
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There is thus cause for optimism that this reflects the ascendency of a 
new approach to the enforcement of equality rights under the Constitution 
of Japan, becoming a new doctrine that may become firmly established as 
the standard means of judicial analysis of discrimination claims. Moreover, 
from a normative perspective, the comparison of the new doctrine to other 
constitutional models and modes of analysis, suggests the importance of the 
judiciary’s continuing along this trajectory. While there are obviously other 
important institutional and systemic factors that explain the failure of the 
Japanese courts to generally enforce constitutional provisions, doctrine is 
both a factor that has contributed to this failure, and a means by which 
meaningful incremental change can be realized. 
This comparative analysis also raises some interesting questions and 
generates some potentially significant observations. For one, the 
similarities between the actual structure of the Japanese equality rights 
provision, and those of the constitutions of Canada and South Africa, and 
the lack of any such similarity between the Japanese and American 
provisions, should raise questions as to why Japanese scholars have been so 
preoccupied with the American doctrine. Both the Japanese and Canadian 
provisions reflect an understanding that the equality right is a substantive 
right rather than merely a procedural or process-driven device, and both are 
focussed on the prohibition of discrimination on grounds that relate to 
personal characteristics. Neither of them suffer from the absence of internal 
limitations that have required the American courts to fashion different 
levels of scrutiny. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
Nationality Act case itself reflects the adoption of analytical tools that are 
very similar to those employed in the Canadian constitutional model, and 
as has been argued here, that approach accords with a more universal 
model of constitutional analysis, one which has been argued by others to be 
central to the rule of law itself, and is more consistent with the underlying 
philosophical foundation of the right as it has been articulated in the 
Constitution of Japan. As such, as part of this new development, it might be 
helpful for Japanese scholars and jurists to begin looking further afield in 
their comparative constitutional foraging. 
From a purely comparative law perspective, the possible emergence of 
a new doctrine in the Japanese constitutional case law, and one that 
resembles in a number of important respects the analytical approaches used 
by courts in other constitutional democracies, is interesting. It is still too 
early to make more robust claims about the possible emergence of a new 
doctrine, as this is only one case, albeit one that appears to have built upon 
seeds planted in earlier dissents. But should the trend continue, this will be 
very fertile territory for exploring whether this represents a striking 
MARTIN_FINAL_JCI.DOC 3/1/2010  11:14:07 AM 
246 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:167 
example of constitutional borrowing or constitutional migration. Here may 
be an example of a constitutional democracy in the very process of 
adopting the proportionality model that has been found to increasingly 
characterize the constitutional jurisprudence of democracies, and if this is 
so, it would constitute an important subject for further detailed study of the 
forces that conspired to encourage the migration. 
Similarly, this comparative analysis should be of some interest to 
American scholars and lawyers, in terms of the insights it provides 
regarding the nature of the American approach to equal protection and 
judicial review of discriminatory government action. For in one sense, the 
“unreasonable discrimination” test employed by the Japanese courts 
reflects something of a worst-case scenario of the U.S. doctrine—a 
laboratory experiment demonstrating the alternate reality of a United States 
in which the Supreme Court had failed to develop strict scrutiny review in 
the early years of the twentieth century. For the “unreasonable 
discrimination” test is essentially the same as the earliest form of the 
minimum scrutiny “rationality” test. At the same time, the analysis of the 
Japanese cases from the perspective of the Canadian constitutional 
approach, as an example of a more universal model, should raise questions 
about the adequacy of the protection provided under even the modern 
American doctrine. For only in the narrow circumstances in which strict 
scrutiny is applied does the American approach conform to the increasingly 
widespread proportionality analysis. Indeed, to the extent that one thinks 
that the right to be treated as an equal and not to be discriminated against is 
a substantive right, rather than simply a mechanism for correcting 
countermajoritarian problems in the democratic process, then the 
comparison of American doctrine with that of Canada and Japan may offer 
some insights about the failings of the American model. Justice Antonin 
Scalia would say that all this is irrelevant, but insomuch as we accept that 
human rights transcend national boundaries, then the way the courts in 
these different constitutional democracies analyze and enforce those rights 
ought to be of interest to us all. 
 
